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FIGHTING THROUGH BRITAIN.  
THE "GIFT DIMENSION" OF KEYNES'S QUEST FOR A NEW GLOBAL ORDER 
 
 








Dissatisfied with both Skidelsky’s “Fighting for Britain” approach to Keynes’s quest for a 
new  global  order  and  its  specular  competitor, the  “Figthing  despite  Britain”  view,  we 
explore the possibility of a “Fighting through Britain” approach to the issue. We claim that 
though  Keynes  was  fighting  for  the  whole  world  rather  than  for  Britain  only,  his 
(unsuccessful) fighting for Britain was a major component of his overall reform project and 
the true telltale sign of his defeat. As a consequence, the paper focuses in particular on the 
American Gift asked for by Keynes in 1945. The Gift is regarded as the last and a relevant 
episode of the economist’s lifelong search for a global system efficiently coping with the 
dilemmas it necessarily gives life to. With the help of the anthropological and sociological 
literature on gift-giving, we move beyond the strategic dimension of Keynes’s diplomacy 
to show that the request for an American Gift to revive multilateralism at the end of WWII 
embodies in full – and helps to understand – Keynes’s attempt to construct a new system 
happily combining  international discipline and national  freedom to choose, the former 
being the instrument to promote the latter. 
 
KEYWORDS: Keynes, International Economic Relations, Gift-giving 




*  E-mail:  mario.cedrini@eco.unipmn.it.  University  of  Eastern  Piedmont,  Department  of  Economics  and 
Quantitative Methods (SEMeQ), Via Perrone 18, 28100 Novara (Italy). The paper has been presented at the 
4th  International  Conference  on  Keynes’s  Influence  on  Modern  Economics  –  The  Keynesian  Revolution 
Reassessed.  Sophia  University,  Tokyo,  Japan,  19-20  March  2008.  We  thank  the  discussant,  Chikako 
Nakayama, as well as the participants for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.  
 
   2
1. INTRODUCTION: FIGHTING FOR, FIGHTING DESPITE OR FIGHTING THROUGH BRITAIN? 
 
The  third  and  last  volume  of  Robert  Skidelsky’s  biography  of  John  Maynard  Keynes, 
dealing mostly with wartime and the negotiations of Bretton Woods and the American 
Loan to Britain, conveys a picture of “Keynes’s part in Britain’s struggle for survival. This 
is a story, above all else, of Keynes’s patriotism” (Skidelsky, 2000: xv), of his fight “to 
preserve Britain as a Great Power against the United States” (ib.). In the American edition 
of the book, Skidelsky (2001) explains that the British subtitle Fighting for Britain “was 
designed to remind readers [...] that national interests do not disappear just because the 
cause is noble”1 (ib.). Though Keynes’s battle was a lost battle, Skidelsky argues following 
Kahn (1976), he also “made mistakes”: 
 
His most important was the strategy he masterminded for the Anglo-American 
loan negotiation of 1945. He persuaded himself, against all the evidence, that he 
could obtain a large gift from the United States to cover Britain’s temporary post-
war balance of payments deficit, without any unacceptable strings. When this hope 
was  disappointed,  he  proved  too  slow-moving  and  indecisive  in  the  actual 
negotiation,  though  he  was  not  helped  by  the  government  in  London.  As  a 
negotiator on this occasion, and in other Anglo-American negotiations, Keynes was 
fallible. It was as an advocate that he was supreme. (Skidelsky, 2000: xvi) 
 
Keynes the advocate, “the Last of the Romans” (De Cecco, 1977: 18) was engaged, during 
WWII, “in the attempt to construct an international economic environment which would 
help Britain to adjust to a lesser role” (ib.: 23). Keynes the “history-maker” as a participant 
in the Versailles conference thus became the “history-taker” in the years of WWII (ib.). 
Born  during  the  apogee  of  Britain-led  gold  standard,  a  life  spent  trying  to  promote 
London’s leadership and improve its quality, Keynes would have been finally defeated by 
the definitiveness of the transfer of global hegemony. Even when dissociated from the 
interpretation of Keynes’s diplomacy as, primarily, the effort to save Britain2, the power-
politics approach is endorsed to explain the final convergence on White’s plans and the 
substantial limitation of the American Loan with respect to Keynes’s expectations. To use 
the words of a well-known rhyme by Dennis Robertson, Britain’s brains could not hope 
winning against the US money bags.  
  Academics  focusing  on  the  global,  rather than  British,  perspective  of  Keynes’s 
diplomacy, tend to reduce the clash of interests between the two powers and emphasize 
the  economist’s  success  in  creating  a  consensus  on  the  need  of  a  new  order  and  its 
Keynesian attributes. They thus insist on the similarities between White’s and Keynes’s 
reform plans (see Ikenberry, 19933; De Long, 2002) or, when differences are held to be 
more relevant, they remark the latter’s efforts to come to an agreement “even when the   3
sacrifice involved his own proposals” (Williamson, 1983: 542). In line with Roy Harrod’s 
(1951) biography, conveying this once conventional “good, coherent narrative” (Newton, 
2000:  190),  Keynes,  a  history-maker  all  his  life  long,  becomes  the  happy  father  of  the 
“embedded  liberalism”  of  Bretton  Woods4,  while  his  partial  defeat  in  negotiating  the 
Bretton Woods order and the American Loan, which Skidelsky seems to regard as the 
symbol of an “American malevolence” (DeLong, 2002: 160) dating back to the Lend Lease 
agreement,  are  considered  as  necessary  tributes  to  “the  greater  power  of  the  United 
States” (ib.). The Loan becomes “the capstone of the great constructive effort on which 
[Keynes] embarked in 1941 to create a world-wide multilateral financial system” (Clarke, 
1982: 6): Britain – and Keynes – could simply not refuse taking its part. Keynes’s request 
for  a  gift  is  then  seen  as  a  sign  of  “political  naïveté”5  or  a  purely  strategic  asset;  its 
transformation into a loan is considered a secondary issue. The “American malevolence”, 
therefore, appears the real element debated, with Keynes either engaged in the impossible 
attempt to “save” his country or happy anyway with the Bretton Woods monetary system 
and an impressive financial assistance to Britain, despite its business character. Keynes the 
British economist of the “Fighting for Britain” approach is thus opposed to Keynes the 
American  economist6  of  the  “Fighting  despite  Britain”  view,  i.e.  fighting  for  a  new 
enlightened order despite Britain’s difficulties to play a major role in it. Is a third way 
inconceivable?  
  Our paper is arguing, following Ferrari Bravo (2002)7, that Keynes was looking for 
a  new  regulation  of  international  relationships  and  a  solution  to  Britain’s  financial 
problems  which  could,  at  the  same  time,  represent  a  remarkable  innovation  in  the 
management  of  world  economy.  This  amounts  to  foster  an  alternative  explanation  for 
Keynes’s diplomacy, which we suggest calling “Fighting through Britain”. We agree with 
the  emphasis  the  “Fighting  despite  Britain”  approach  lays  on  the  positive  results  of 
Keynes’s attempt to offer the world a “sounder political economy between all nations”8 
through  the  Bretton  Woods  agreement,  and  consider  this  as  the  real  target  of  both 
Keynes’s theoretical contributions and practical diplomacy. In line with the “Fighting for 
Britain” approach, we claim nonetheless that Keynes’s disappointment with both the final 
settlement of Bretton Woods and the Anglo-American negotiation of the Loan can scarcely 
be undervalued9. The hypothesis is here explored that Keynes was fighting for the whole 
world rather than for Britain only, but with his unsuccessful fighting for Britain as a major 
component of his overall reform project and the true telltale sign of his defeat. In so doing, 
we are forced to analyse the crucial marker of the “American malevolence”, namely the 
negotiations of the American Loan. According to Skidelsky, Keynes’s hopes for a gift – 
which was the essence of “Justice”, or the reconsideration of the war costs to the benefit of   4
a overburdened Britain he called for in the key memorandum for the negotiations10 – were 
misplaced: 
 
The coherence of his memorandum lay in the realm of morals rather than finance. 
Keynes was using Justice in its classic Aristotelian sense of just desert. [...] His 
categories were ultimately moral, not power political. But, if morality was not just 
a cloak for self-interest, it was certainly a vehicle for illusion. The hope for gifts to 
rescue Britain from the consequences of policy had become by 1945 a necessary 
illusion – the only way of averting the eyes of British policymakers from the truth 
that  in  fighting  a  “just”  war  Britain  had  lost  its  position  as  a  Great  Power. 
(Skidelsky, 2000: 384). 
 
Here  would  lie  Keynes’s  “tactical”  mistake:  “[g]reat  Powers  are  kept  going  not  by 
gratitude, but by incentives – carrots and sticks – they can deploy to induce other Powers 
to do what they want” (ib.: 385). Britain was a beggar, and beggars cannot be choosers 
(Pressnell, 2003).  
  A  “Fighting  through  Britain”  approach  calls  for  a  re-examination  of  Keynes’s 
request to the US for a gift rather than a loan, of his defeat more than his achievements. A 
move  beyond  the  purely  strategic  dimension  of  Keynes’s  diplomacy,  which  has  been 
attracting  almost  all  the  attention  of  works  on  this  topic,  allows  us  to  focus  on  the 
coherence between Keynes’s appreciation of the pre-war monetary regime, his calls for a 
responsible  international  leadership  after  WWI,  his  plans  for  Bretton  Woods  and  his 
request for an American Gift in 1945, and to suggest that the last is a constitutive element 
of this coherence. Our work would like to gather up the “two Keynes” (Agnati, Covi and 
Ferrari  Bravo,  1983),  i.e.  the  economist  who  revolutionized  economic  theory  and  the 
international negotiator who managed in the end, despite a long series of failures and 
often with adverse compromises, to offer the world a new international architecture, into a 
unique, though highly complex picture. Persuasive essays on Keynes’s diplomacy (like 
Ferrari  Bravo,  1990,  and  Markwell,  2006)  are  held  into  great  consideration,  due to the 
reasonable hypothesis of continuity which we want to investigate following Vines’s (2003) 
advice, between the “method” – as discussed by Carabelli (1988) – Keynes, a “thinker of 
complexity” (Marchionatti, 2002), used to copy theoretically, in his major works, with the 
economic material, and that he developed to deal with global integration and international 
decision-making. Insights from anthropology and sociology are used in the attempt to 
show  that  what  we  suggest  calling  the  “Gift  dimension”  of  Keynes’s  vision  about 
international economic relations might help to throw light on his lifelong quest for a new 
global order. The American Gift episode is here regarded not as an undeserved incursion 
in the realm of moral, but, on the contrary, as the last and a significant attempt to cope 
with the dilemmas of the international system. We thus hope to contribute to the debate   5
by  pointing  out  that  both  Keynes’s  theoretical  contributions  and  diplomacy  offer  still 
unexplored intuitions to conceive a global order respectful of economic interdependence 
for intrinsically complex international relations.  
 
2. COPING WITH THE DILEMMAS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:  THE DIALECTIC BETWEEN 
DISCIPLINE AND FREEDOM 
 
Moggridge  (1986)  remarks  that  Keynes’s quest  for  a  new monetary order  shows some 
strong elements of continuity, 
 
most notably in the attempts to devise means for a “scientific management of the central 
controls...  of  our  economic  life"  [...]  Throughout  most  of  Keynes's  writings  on  the 
subject, there was an effort to combine an international system with the maximum of 
national monetary independence. In many ways, this was a particular British concern 
[...] as she decline from being "the conductor of the international orchestra" [...] to 
less  exalted  status.  Nevertheless,  it  brought  the  need  to  face  the  realities  and  the 
dilemmas  of  the  system  and  to  try  and  find  ways  of  living  with  them  [...]  (ib.:  80; 
emphasis added). 
 
Brought up in the age of a gold standard  managed by London with  its  self-contained 
Empire, the financial system being considered as the key variable for prosperity, Keynes 
was primarily interested in the world monetary architecture (De Cecco, 1977). Someway, 
the dilemmas of the international monetary order Moggridge – and Keynes himself – are 
referring to can be regarded as those of the global system tout court. Our intent is to retrace 
the core episodes of the dialectic or moving equilibrium between freedom and discipline 
which we hold to be constitutive of Keynes’s reform plans. 
Indian Currency and Finance is an exercise in devising a “scientific management” of 
the international  system. By proposing to extend to the whole European continent the 
efficient  methods  India  had  elaborated  to  deal  with  the  rules  of  the  pre-war  regime11 
Keynes depicted the gold exchange standard as “the ideal currency system of the future”12. 
Its aim was to economize on gold reserves by reducing the monetary demand for gold, 
since “although no doubt they serve some purpose when they are held for show only, 
[gold reserves] exist to much better purpose if they are held for use also”13, namely to face 
international obligations14. Due both to its role of leading international financial centre – 
the “envy of the rest of the world”15 – and to its willingness to adopt foreign lending 
policies functional to the development of emerging countries, London was to be at the core 
of a new European system regulating its standard “on a more rational and stable basis”16. 
Keynes’s first step on the way to give monetary institutions greater flexibility to pursue 
domestic  targets  (Cesarano,  2003:  492),  Indian  Currency  and  Finance  is  the  only  one  of   6
Keynes’s major works to have appeared during the gold standard époque. The proposals 
there included foreshadowed not only the suggestions of A Tract on Monetary Reform and 
A Treatise on Money but also his plans in the 40s (see Dimand, 198917), which strengthens 
the  belief  that  Keynes’s  projects  to  reform  the  world  architecture  configure  a  sort  of 
revolution  in  continuity  with  the  pre-war  monetary  regime.  The  pre-1914 
internationalization he described in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, demonstrating 
the extent to which the gold standard was “embedded in political culture” of pre-war 
Britain  (Daunton,  2006:  24),  is  the  “lost  paradise”  (Dimand,  2006:  175) Keynes tried  to 
revive under necessarily different forms for the post-war world. A sterling more than a 
gold  standard,  relying  on  Britain’s  ability  to  make  the  Empire  finance  its  deficit  with 
Europe and the US, and on the use of the discount rate as a means of attracting gold from 
the  continent  to  match  the  “new”  countries’  rapid  development,  the  system  ensured 
reserve countries the possibility to face their short term balance-of-payments deficits while 
investing  long  term  in  peripheral  countries  and  easing  their  adjustments18.  Thus, 
multilateralism and dynamism characterized the pre-war order (De Cecco, 1979a). Britain, 
“the conductor of the international orchestra”19, provided the international system with a 
leadership who possessed the means and the willingness to behave responsibly, as Keynes 
would recall in his memos for the ICU; that is, to act in such a way to promote, limiting the 
strict discipline imposed by the rigid classical mechanisms, the other members’ freedom to 
choose and their full participation to its dynamics with it. The “Great Transformation” 
(Polanyi  1944)  and  the  consequences  of  the  war  broke  the  gold  standard  harmony. 
Keynes’s  struggle  against  the  restoration  rule  of  the  regime20  was  fought  for  domestic 
reasons, but the prosperity and the pattern of peaceful international relations promoted by 
the classical adjustment mechanisms are the most relevant references recalled by Keynes 
for the ICU when proposing his plan. His later criticisms to the gold standard were mainly 
directed to the idea of restoring its architecture as if “time and circumstances”21 had not 
changed  radically;  as  if  the  equilibrium  between  national  freedom  and  international 
discipline  lying  at  the  basis  of  the  pre-war  standard  had  not  been  threatened  by  the 
introduction of national policy autonomy as a new key variable.  
“[C]ombin[ing] an international system with the maximum of national monetary 
independence” (Moggridge, 1986: 80) was in fact to be the target of A Tract on Monetary 
Reform as well as of A Treatise on Money, both of them exposing a “dilemma” for individual 
nations: that between price stability and exchanges stability in the former, and between 
adhering to an international standard and national autonomy in the latter. In the Monetary 
Reform, on which he based his unsuccessfull crusade against Britain’s return to the pre-war 
parity,  Keynes  suggested  separating  the  gold  reserve  from  the  note  issue22  and   7
substantially argued for national monetary independence, price stability being favoured 
over exchange stability to avoid the drastic adjustments required by the return to gold. 
Both the fundamental breaking with the restoration rule of the gold standard occurred at 
the end of the war, undermining the regime’s credibility (Cesarano, 2006), and the new 
awareness of the slowness of specie-flow adjustment mechanisms, with gold itself turning 
out  a  managed  currency,  asked  Keynes  to  reshape  the  international  system,  freeing 
monetary policy to point at price stability. This however required substantial efforts of 
international cooperation. Since the Monetary Reform, Keynes conceived a series of schemes 
always providing either for leading countries or an institution in charge of international 
money. He had already called for international cooperation in his plans for the Genoa 
Conference, based on “many of his later priorities [...]: a modicum of exchange stability to 
foster international trade and investment; avoidance of deflationary policies to improve 
exchange rates, given their implications for debtors and wage-earners; gold reserves for 
use  not  show”  (Moggridge,  1992:  377-378).  In  short,  a  qualified  return  to  the  gold 
standard, with the US asked for to assist countries showing low levels of gold reserves in 
their “slow action”23 towards recovering the old parities and rejoin revaluating nations, 
helped by a sort of crawling peg24 to enter ab initio a substantially uniform system. Yet the 
conference  showed  that  the  project  was  doomed  to  failure.  Foreign  lending,  once  a 
relevant  pillar  and  a  fundamental  stabilizing  factor  of  the  pre-war  gold  standard  (see 
Daunton, 2006), had become an investment policy, posing serious obstacles to reducing 
unemployment in Britain. London’s difficulties to cope with the war economic legacy and 
its historical decline as an export country went along with the US unwillingness to act in 
such  a  disinterested  manner  as  to  serve  the  general  interests  of  the  system  to  deny 
international relations any possibility of improvement by agreement25.  
Due to doubts on the Federal Reserve’s commitment to exercise wisely its discretion 
powers (Moggridge, 1986), the Monetary Reform was disseminated with references to the 
British desire of economic independence from the US. In December 1923, Keynes admitted 
that “[g]old standard is  now a dollar standard”26; which meant, he clarified two years 
later,  “nothing  but  to  have  the  same  price  level  and  the  same  money  rates  (broadly 
speaking)  as  the  United  States.  The  whole  object  is  to  link  rigidly  the  City  and  Wall 
Street”27.  But  Britain’s  road  to recovery required a  way  out  of  “unemployment  amidst 
dearth”28, and London was now indebted with the US. Accordingly, Keynes declared his 
preference for a good, rather than a gold standard: he stated the need of “a standard of 
currency regulated primarily by reference to the requirements of the credit system at home 
and  to  the  stability  of  internal  prices”29,  and  urged  rejecting  the  option  “to  accept  an 
unsatisfactory international standard, in the hope of improving it later on by organised   8
international co-operation”30. International cooperation was ruled out by the irresoluble 
clash between debtors and creditors. As Keynes observed in the Monetary Reform, the case 
against the gold standard was favoured by the unbalanced international distribution of 
gold: during the Twenties, France and the US had been accumulating broad gold reserves, 
thus decreasing international liquidity. With the result, he remarked in his 1929 lectures, 
that foreign investment, namely the “process by which rich countries spread the proceeds 
of their wealth over the world, and thus is internationally desirable”, can no more “be 
strongly  supported  on  nationalist  grounds”31,  since  the  working  of  the  adjustment 
mechanism  provided  by  raised  prices  in  borrowing  countries  was  impeded.  Monetary 
policies “à la Midas” were increasingly coupled with protectionism; a “malign neglect” for 
international  adjustment  quick  resulted,  compelling  the  world  and  Britain  to  a 
deflationary  decade.  In  a  world  where  surplus  countries  do  not  permit  painless 
international  adjustments,  the  “secular  international  problem”32,  that  is  the  historical 
negative bias of the global order against deficit countries, came to occupy the forefront of 
Keynes’s concerns.  
In  The  Treatise  on  Money,  Keynes  came  to  consider  an  international  standard  of 
value as desirable again, provided the system assures to its members the ability to face the 
dilemmas it necessarily gives life to33. A global standard, he stated, ensures uniformity, 
makes  foreign  lending  easier  by  reducing  costs  and  risks  and  prevents  extravagant 
national behaviours and major perturbations with them. However, given the complexity it 
brings into a system eventually lacking a leading centre, while introducing an element of 
high mobility, that of capital flows, in an otherwise rigid structure, it amplifies medium-
sized perturbations. Therefore, countries cannot escape “the dilemma of an international 
system”, or the need  
 
“to preserve the advantages of the stability of the local currencies of the various 
members of the system in terms of the international standard, and to preserve at 
the same time an adequate local autonomy for each member over its domestic rate 
of interest and its volume of foreign lending”34.  
 
In other words, the need to adopt monetary policies in line with the average behaviour of 
the other members and that of managing the interest rate with a view to obtaining the 
internal economic optimum. Britain’s exposition to the constraints of the dilemma for the 
first  time  in  recent  history,  London  being  no  more  able  to  influence  the  world  credit 
conditions, led Keynes to assign himself the task of sketching, in his view of economic 
history as a permanent conflict between creditors and debtors (De Cecco, 2001), a model of 
national behaviour consistent with the general interests of the system (Moggridge, 1986); a 
modus vivendi inspired by the need to eliminate the consequences of the inevitable conflict   9
between international discipline and freedom to choose, i.e. national policy space available 
to the members of the system.  
Due to the possibility of a “real divergence of interests”, and the fact that “we must 
not expect of central banks a degree of international disinterestedness far in advance of 
national  sentiment  and  of  behaviour  of  the  other  organs  of  national  government”35  to 
favour the general interest, only nuanced criticisms to the creditors, France and the US, are 
exposed in the Treatise, despite their active contribution to the instability of the system. 
More  direct  attack  against  uncooperative  behaviour  and  inactivity  with  respect  to  the 
Great  Depression  and  followed  during  the  sterling  crisis  of  1931.  “Instead  of  being  a 
means of facilitating international trade, the gold standard has become a curse laid upon 
the economic life of the world”36: Keynes argued that if the fall in world prices was due to 
the imbalanced distribution of gold, “[t]he reason for this concentration of gold in America 
and  France  is  that  these  countries  have  not  lent  their  surplus balance  on  international 
account  as  Great  Britain  used  to  do  in  the  past”37.  Creditors’  liquidity  preference  was 
turning global relations into a zero- (and even negative-) sum game, leading Keynes to 
give weight to unorthodox solutions, like the “isolationist” one he advanced to free Britain 
from international dynamics made dramatic by the lack of shared responsibility for the 
imbalances. After declaring the end of the gold standard, he argued more surprisingly for 
the end of free trade too, ending up with exalting national self-sufficiency38 and calling for 
a strengthening of the Imperial links. While blaming France and US for refusing to follow 
the  rules  of  the  game,  he  envisaged  “a  partial  departure  from  international  monetary 
system in the direction of barter”39, and as an alternative he proposed a gold conference to 
the creditor countries to save the standard. This “rather half-hearted and desperate call” 
(Moggridge,  1986:  65)  was  motivated,  as  Keynes  had  explained  on  introducing  his 
proposal for revenue tariffs in March 1931, by the need to resume Britain’s leadership as 
an “international cure [...] remedying the international slump”40. He thought it necessary 
“to restore full confidence in London”41, since no other country seemed to possess “the 
experience or the public spirit”42 to play that role. Once off the gold standard, Britain could 
play “the part of a reasonable creditor”43 moderating her claims in conjonction with the fall 
in world prices, whereas on France and the US “will fall the curse of Midas. As a result of 
their unwillingness to exchange their exports except for gold their trade exports will dry 
up  and  disappear  until  they  no  longer  have  any  either  a  favourable  trade  balance  or 
foreign  deposits  to  repatriate”44.  A  “competitive  struggle  for  liquidity”45  was  inducing 
every government  
 
to  make  its  international  balance  sheet  more  liquid  by  restricting  imports  and 
stimulating  exports  by  every  possible  means,  the  success  of  each  one  in  this   10
direction meaning the defeat of someone else. Moreover every country tries to stop 
capital development within its own borders for fear of the effect on its international 
balance. Yet it will only be successful in its objects in so far as its progress towards 
negation is greater than that of its neighbours46.  
 
Britain should pose an end to this “extreme example of the disharmony of general and 
particular interest”47 by regaining its liberty of action and power of international initiative 
to the advantage of all48, whereas the undermining of the gold countries’ “anti-social”49 
competitive position would have been, Keynes cried, “a case of poetic justice”50.  
The pars construens of his criticisms to the interwar period nonsystem prepared the 
ground for the reform plans of the 40s. To the Macmillan Committee, Keynes had already 
gone so far as to suggest a “concerted policy between the leading central banks of the 
world [...] to raise prices to a parity with the international level of money incomes and 
with the international level of money costs of production”51. “We cannot expect them to do 
it from mere altruism”, Keynes agreed with Macmillan, “but now that the fall of prices in 
the rest of the world is affecting [the US] hardly less than it is affecting us, there would be 
more possibility of getting collective action, and more reasonable indeed to ask for it on 
the  ground  that  it  is  now  an  international  problem”52.  A  model  for  cooperation  was 
suggested to Keynes – and used in the Treatise – by the new-born Bank for International 
Settlements, to be possibly used in the future as a supranational authority remedying the 
asymmetries of the gold standard and the “already apparent”53 shortage of gold through a 
new  international  currency,  with  the  deposits  of  a  World  Bank  taking  “the  place  of 
balances in foreign countries as a reserve, and as a substitute for gold” (Ib.). Its future 
usefulness, however, depended “on the support it receives from the United States”; that is, 
on the US “selfishness” or, better, its “suspicion towards the older centres of civilisation”54. 
The 1933 World Economic Conference offered Keynes the chance to publicly ask the 
US55 to lead a combined international action to spread loan-expenditures and raise world 
prices. The aim of the “spectacular”56 Keynes-Henderson plan was to relieve the anxieties 
of central banks and their concerns about reserves, leading all countries to purchase again, 
to remove barriers to trade, by providing them the means of doing so – and among them, 
he would later argue, a certain freedom to modify exchange parities57. Keynes welcomed 
Roosevelt’s decision to devalue the dollar while pursuing the New Deal, since it could 
signify  an  era  of  optimism  for  international  relations.  There  was  an  alternative  to  the 
undermining  of  creditor  countries’  competitive  position:  a  strong  commitment  by  the 
leader(s)  of  the  system  to  make  the  first  move  towards  a  freer  world,  leaving  behind 
protectionism and laissez-faire, which had led the US to impede the adjustment. A policy 
twice blessed, Keynes would observe in The General Theory, while blaming laissez-faire and 
the gold standard for promoting mercantilism as a means of surviving in the struggle for   11
markets. On the contrary, regaining control over the interest rate could help both countries 
adopting  them  and  their  neighbours  at  the  same  time  to  reach  and  maintain  full 
employment at home. Here was a new model of national behaviour consistent with the 
general interests of the system: countries, and especially deficit nations, should live in an 
international system granting them the freedom to adopt expansionist policies, instead of 
imposing its members the austerity cure to restore equilibrium. The problem was now 
how to achieve this result.  
 
3. TOWARDS A SOUNDER POLITICAL ECONOMY AMONG NATIONS 
 
WWI had taught Keynes how difficult  it  may be to promote international cooperation 
lacking the initiative of a responsible leader. At the end of the war, he “joined others in 
appealing [...] for US leadership in the international action they prescribed” but the US 
refusal to exercise it “left Keynes throughout the 1920s to devise means of acting without 
the USA” (Markwell, 2006: 91). The war-induced shift of global financial power had in 
effect  revealed  a  dangerous  vacancy  in  international  leadership.  Already  in  1917,  the 
progressive  depletion  of  the  reserves  Britain  was  using  to  finance  the  common  cause 
against Germany had forced the country to enter a relationship of dependence with the US 
seriously threatening “the whole financial fabric of the alliance”58. Keynes unsuccessfully 
called for the American support to the dollar-sterling exchange rate. Not disposed to save 
Britain’s  financial  power,  the  US  offered  conditional  assistance,  compelling  recipient 
countries to purchase American war materials. After showing that the imbalances between 
the financial positions of Britain and the US were due to high differentials in sacrifices 
made by the two powers to save the Allies, Keynes advised his government to ask the US 
to grant direct assistance to the Allies, but the US was firm in its decision to use Britain as 
a “conduit pipe”59.  
Keynes’s first true attempt to trigger the US financial intervention in the interests of 
Europe (Ferrari Bravo, 1990: 172) and indirectly the whole world came at the end of the 
war.  It  was  the  task  of  a  responsible  world  leadership,  in  his  view,  to  free  European 
countries from the excessive burden of reparations and Inter-Allied debts. As he wrote in 
the  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,  “the  financial  problems  which  were  about  to 
exercise  Europe  could  not  be  solved  by  greed.  The  possibility  of  their  cure  lay  in 
magnanimity”60.  But  to  get  magnanimity  from  America,  Europe  “must  herself  practise 
it”61.  As  he  wrote  in  a  memorandum  destined  to  President  Wilson62,  debt  cancellation 
would have induced European countries to renounce stripping Germany and one another, 
freed  Berlin  from  the  impossible  task  of  extracting  excessive  resources  to  finance   12
reparations  and  offered  Europe  new  means  of  regaining  prosperity.  In  fact,  due  to 
Germany’s central role in European economy, reparations were obtainable only at a high 
cost for the continent: in the best-case scenario, creditor countries would have actively 
contributed to Berlin’s return to competitiveness, with far from negligible repercussions 
on  their  own  trade  structures.  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace  had  shown  how 
Europe’s destiny strictly relied on the “central support”63 provided by Germany, round 
which “the rest of the European economic system”64 had grouped itself before 1914. A 
fundamental outlet for European products, a large source of supply to European powers 
and the origin of the capital indispensable to the development of many of them, “on the 
prosperity and enterprise of Germany the prosperity of the rest of the continent mainly 
depended”65. Hence Keynes’s request to the US for a substantial gift, to be followed by 
Britain’s commitment to renounce its part of reparations. The view of Inter-allied debts as 
“purely business obligations”66 was a false analogy with the pre-1914 world: he remarked 
that the existence of great war debts67 was a menace to financial stability – “[a] debtor 
nation does not love its creditor”68 – and would have led to a “one way”69 trade, Britain 
willing to repay through its exports only. New American loans to London would have 
worsened  Britain’s  financial  situation,  and  caused  a  sterling  depreciation  to  reduce 
pressures.  
The Americans never accepted to treat the reparations issue and the Inter-Allied 
debts as parts of a unique problem70. According to the US, no reasons of justice or moral 
issues  were  involved,  as  the  dispute  with  the  editors  of  New  Republic  on  the  business 
character of the American Debt was to confirm. In their reply to a 1928 article by Keynes 
titled “A London View of the War Debts”, the editors argued that Keynes was “veiling the 
controversy” with “dubious moral attitudes”71. Keynes made the argument that in 1917 
and  1918,  the  Americans  were  engaged  in  war,  not  in  investment:  as  he  wrote  to  an 
America correspondent, America had not  
 
“any ‘obligation’ to do anything whatever […]. I do not suggest for a moment that 




“if America had announced from the first that they were advancing money, not to 
save  civilisation  [...]  but  as  the  best  business  investment  available  in  the 
circumstances, no one would have objected to their maintaining the same business 
attitude subsequently”73.  
 
Washington denied its assistance once again, and more significantly74, when he proposed a 
“grand scheme for the rehabilitation of Europe”75, requiring the Allies, and the Americans   13
in primis, to underwrite the issuing of reparations bonds by Germany. By ensuring the 
gradually reduction of the financial consequences of the war, this “world-wide scheme for 
the preservation of the credit of Europe”76, “the sole object of which is to set on its feet” the 
continent77, would have helped European countries secure their first post-war imports, 
coming essentially from the US, while Germany would have been able to contribute to the 
settlement of the Inter-Allied debts with no immediate adverse effects on its balance of 
payments. Most of all, the scheme was to reduce the imbalances between the “two great 
continents, America and Europe, the one destitute and on the point of collapse and the 
other overflowing with goods which it wishes to dispose of”78. Following Harrod (1951), 
some have described it as a small-scale Marshall Plan (Markwell, 2006), and even, not 
without reasons, as the real antecedent for the ICU plan (Williamson, 1983). After realizing 
that the scheme was a non-starter, Keynes cleverly observed that “Washington rejects my 
proposals by reason of their strong desire to clear out of European responsibility (without 
however realising what this will mean to Europe)”79. 
Nor was the Amsterdam conference in October 1919, exploring the idea of a new 
international  currency  issued  by  a  supranational  bank,  to  command  a  consensus  in 
Washington,  whose  homage  to  laissez-faire  made  it  unconceivable  to  support 
international loans involving governments directly (Markwell, 2006). Since “some of the 
countries [are not] strong enough to make good the loss, unless a part of the burden is 
carried  by  the  others”80,  the  proponents  and  Keynes  among  them  called  for  a  “great 
international  act  of  co-operative  assistance”81  to  redistribute  the  war  costs,  through  an 
international loan and by cancelling interest charges or even that portion of the creditors’ 
claims82 which  “reacted  to  the benefit  of  the  loaning  countries,  in  waging  what was a 
common cause”83. The Keynes-directed “training in leadership” experiment destined to 
the US had failed. By denying de facto the European economic interdependence, which 
was  the  core  issue  of  Keynes’s  best-seller,  and  the  fallacy  of  composition  among  the 
contrasting  interests  of  single  European  countries,  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  voluntarily 
forgot,  as  remarked  by  Carr  (1982),  the  economic  problem  of  Europe.  The  list  of 
unanswered appeals (Markwell, 2006) Keynes included in the Economic Consequences of the 
Peace  showed  to  the  whole  world  that  the  Americans  had  declined  responsibility  to 
intervene financially in the economic destiny of Europe, and that Europe itself had chose 
not to practise magnanimity. From then on, Keynes wrote in 1921, America could but buy 
more and sell less84.  
All this indirectly shows that Moggridge’s (1986) suggestion to emphasize the need 
to  face,  and  find  ways  of  living  with,  the  dilemmas  of  the  system  as  the  element  of 
continuity in Keynes’s reform plans is of the highest value: that between the advantages of   14
international discipline in terms of stability and trade and the freedom to choose offered 
by national policy space is seen by Keynes as a true dilemma. As shown by Carabelli and 
De Vecchi (2001), complexity, interdependence and organicness, all attributes of Keynes’s 
vision  about  the  international  environment,  are  usually  associated,  in  the  economist’s 
thought, with conflicts and fallacies. “Remedies to the intrinsic conflict between individual 
and social interest, and to uncertainty, are beyond the reach of the individual” (Ib.: 232); 
they are external remedies, having a social nature, and are typically provided for by public 
institutions, able to pursue collective interests. Keynes’s projects for global cooperation in 
the Fourties were inspired by the belief that an international institution could serve the 
task he had assigned to a leading country willing to use its power in order to enhance, 
rather than repress, the other countries’ capability to participate into a shared legitimate 
order. At Bretton Woods, Keynes was once again confronted with the need of stabilizing a 
process  of  international  economic  recovery  by  “resolving  politically  the  historical 
contradiction between the verticality of the hegemonic economic power and the horizontal 
issue of international cooperation” (Ferrari Bravo, 1990: 206). In his search for a global 
order promoting economic stability despite the lack of a “‘leader’ or ‘hegemon’ able and 
willing  to  maintain”  the  order  itself  (Markwell,  1995:  208),    Keynes  made  a  case  for 
international management: as Cairncross (1978) puts it,  
 
In an anarchic world he accepted the need for each country to preserve its freedom 
of action [...] Without international management, however, the task of individual 
governments would become indefinitely more difficult. Just as individuals could 
not  develop  their  full  potential  without  government  planning  of  the  level  of 
effective demand and other matters, so individual countries would find it hard to 
keep in internal and external balance and maintain full employment unless they 
operated within a framework of international institutions planned and managed 
for the common good (ib.: 46).  
 
At the beginning of WWII, Keynes wrote a memorandum destined to President Roosevelt, 
stressing  that  the  new  Inter-Allied  agreements  should  avoid  being  inspired  by  the 
business moral of the last war85. He proposed a joint purchasing board for war materials, 
to be financed by governments through interest-free loans; the Americans would have 
played a major part, yielding their “lunatic”86 gold excesses as “a part of the contribution 
of the United States to the post-war reconstruction of Europe”87. Those very words used by 
Keynes to criticize, in the early Thirties, the US malign neglect for the general interests of 
the system, were here deployed to ask the Americans to pose their reserves to the service 
of  mankind,  with  a  spirit  of  “unprecedented  generosity”88.  The  joint  financing  of  the 
common  cause,  Keynes  wrote  in  1940,  should  take  the  form  of  a  “complete  pooling 
agreement of foreign resources in gold, securities and current trade balances”89. A plan   15
“on spectacular lines” – “[t]he policy of cautious and timid approach to U.S.A. is a wrong 
psychology. They are much more likely to fall for something big and imaginative”90 – with 
the aim of produce a state of general confidence and the advantage of complying with the 
US desire to condition its assistance to purchases of its exports91. Britain was to act once 
again  as  the  financial  leader  of  the  Allies  coalition,  making  its  gold  available  for  the 
common cause. Of the proposal nothing survived. Rather soon it appeared that once again 
Washington was not disposed to help London until the almost complete depletion of its 
reserves. “But in reaching such a decision the U.S. Administration should not overlook the 
effect of what they may do on the post-war equilibrium of international trade”92: Keynes 
openly threatened to recur to “a system of very strict bilateral agreements which would tie 
up the payment for our imports and our foreign debts with the acceptance of our exports 
by the other country”93. Lend Lease, launched in March 1941, was a significant departure 
from the “purely business aspect of things”94, but it soonly opened up the question of 
“consideration”, i.e. what Britain should give in return. Roosevelt knew that he could gain 
a “complete control over the form of the UK’s long-run rehabilitation” as well as on the 
“conditions under which Britain would recover the export markets which, during war, it 
had abandoned”; in a word, “the right to determine the institutional structure of the post-
war world” (Vines, 2003: 344), and the dismantlement of the British Empire with it. Keynes 
prepared a skeleton draft for “consideration”, warning that Britain should “be ready to 
accept clauses which might really cost us something”95 rather than rely on the logic of 
strict equivalence:  
 
“where it is a case of conceding something which has a non-economic significance 
to  the  President  and  to  the  future  ordering  of  the  world,  then  we  might  consider 
whether it would not be proper for us to concede it even though it did cost us an 
economic price”96.  
 
An  Anglo-American  Commission  could  be  set  up,  he  suggested,  charged  with  the 
preparation  of  cooperation  schemes  “for  the  better  ordering  of  economic  intercourse 
between nations after the transitional period has been ended”97. Keynes knew that “[i]f the 
Americans are of a mind to continue their assistance after the armistice, we shall, from the 
strictly  economic  standpoint,  gain  much  more than  we  are  likely  to be  called upon to 
sacrifice as ‘consideration’”98.  
In  sum,  Keynes  was  closely  connecting  war-time  and  post-war  American 
contribution to “the future ordering of the world”, as later confirmed by the second draft 
of his ICU plan, where he asked Whitehall not to sacrifice constructive proposals on the 
altar of “self-regarding interest”99, not least because the US would hardly help a beggar 
country, and an isolationist one, ready to use external assistance to strengthen the Sterling   16
Area agreements. Asking for a direct American gift or interest-free loan or generous gold 
redistribution to Britain would be an error, he remarked;  
 
“[t]he assistance for which we can  hope must  be indirect  and  a consequence of 
setting the world as a whole on its feet and of laying the foundations of a sounder 
political economy between all nations”100.  
 
This required an “ambitious plan of an  international complexion, suitable to serve the 
interests  of  others  besides  ourselves”101,  destined  to  solve  “the  outstanding  economic 
problem  of the  post-war  world”, that  is  “how  the  U.S.A. is  to redress  her  unbalanced 
creditor  position”102.  A  plan  easier  to  obtain,  and  more  satisfactory  with  respect  to  a 
redistribution  of  the  only  world  creditor’s  gold  to  the  general  benefit.  Redistribution 
agreements are temporary, uneasily obtainable and manageable, and subject to political 
influence, while a second New Deal, the world sharing with the US the benefits of an 
increased American domestic demand, could have been but a luckily accident103. He thus 
regarded the American participation to “a system of general and collective responsibility, 
applying  to  all  countries  alike”104,  for  the  managing  of  the  future  world,  as  the  most 
relevant aim attainable through his plan.  
Not reducible to a simple fight for Britain’s status in the post-war order105, Keynes’s 
task seems to induce the US to undertake a sort of training in leadership and help its 
behaviour be permeated by other principles than those followed at the end of WWI and 
during the interwar period. But he had become fully aware of the risks a system has to 
tolerate when it depends so critically on the willingness of its most powerful members to 
respect  the  rules  of  the  game.  His  suggestion  was  then  “to  achieve  by  multilateral 
cooperation  what  Britain  leadership  of  the  international  economy  had  once  done 
(Markwell,  2007:  261)  and  naturally  focused  on  creditor  countries.  While  previous 
proposals were mostly directed to help deficit countries alleviate their short-term balance-
of-payments problems “in the hope that surplus countries would allow the adjustment 
mechanism  to  operate”  (Moggridge,  1986:  71),  the  ICU  plan  directly  asked  creditor 
countries to take the initiative: that is, to make available to deficit countries those resources 
they  choose to  leave  idle  or  accumulate  due  to  a  lack  of  opportunities  to  invest them 
profitably at home. Unprecedented sanctions were posed on surpluses106, but as Keynes 
explained to his assistant in Washington, Thompson Mc-Causland, who had observed that 
the ICU configured an “automatic surrender of surplus” (in Skidelsky, 2000: 213), his plan 
was  to  oppose  any  deviation  from  the  equilibrium;  creditor  themselves  would  have 
considered  it  in  their  own  interest,  granting  them  time  to  redress  their  economies107. 
Keynes was really making a case for the disarmament in international economic relations 
(Moggridge, 1992); in more imaginative words, he was projecting the Economic Possibilities   17
for  Our  Grandchildren  on  the  international  level  (Mini,  1994).  Later  drafts  of  the  plan 
confirmed that not surplus countries per se, but their uncooperative behaviour, imposing 
rigid constraints to the freedom to choose of the rest of the world, should be made the 
object of condemnation. 
The  threat  to  depart  from  the  international  monetary  system in  the  direction  of 
barter, to which Keynes had recurred on various occasions in the past to ovcercome the US 
refusal to cooperate, acquired strong relevance at the beginning of the process which led 
him  to  propose  the  ICU  plan.  His  initial  “illiberal”  response  (Vines,  2003:  348)  to  the 
secular international problem had some points in common with the Schachtian system108 
of  bilateral  clearing  agreements  established  between  Germany  on  the  one  side  and 
European and Latin American countries on the other, to conduct trade essentially without 
foreign  exchange,  as  an  international  barter  centred  on  Berlin.  A  radical  system, 
substituting territorial for universal money, restricted for generalized purchasing power, 
communitarian  for  individual  decisions,  negotiated  for  market-based  exchange  rates 
(Mini, 2006). Nevertheless, Keynes praised its virtues in his reply to Walter Funk’s New 
Order, observing that the essence of free trade lies in “trading goods against goods”109, but 
after  WWI,  laissez-faire  in  foreign  exchanges  had  disordered  trade  relations,  since 
countries lacking not goods but gold could nevertheless bankrupt110. Here is why initially 
Keynes  argued  in  favour  of  a  Schachtian  system  enlarged  to  the  whole  continent  and 
centred  on  Britain,  since  Britain  alone could evolve “a  post-war  order  which  seeks  no 
particularistic advantage”111. Schachtism, he remarked, did not impose undue pressures on 
debtor countries, and had the advantage of preventing by agreement undesired capital 
flows from debtor to creditor countries.  
How  did  the  ICU,  a  “refinement  and  improvement of  the Schachtian  device”112, 
come to represent the ideal alternative to Schachtism itself, and Justice be advanced as the 
only possibility for Britain to avoid being caught in the Starvation Corner of Schachtism? 
Mini’s (1994) suggestive answer is that Keynes’s Schachtian plans were meant for a world 
left alone by the US: “Keynes’s 1941 visit to the US left him deeply pessimistic as to the 
ability of that country to play anything other than a destabilizing role in the international 
economy” (Moggridge, 2002: 118), to the extent that on commenting Funk’s New Order, 
he  argued  for  future  discrimination  against  the  US  “if  she  persists  in  maintaining  an 
unbalanced  creditor  position”113.  Keynes’s  Schachtism  was  a  means  of  making  it 
impossible  for  major  economic  players  like  the  US  to  act  against  the  “interests  of  the 
restoration of international equilibrium”114. Late in 1941, Keynes told Harrod (1951) that he 
had to pursue both lines of thought, bilateralism and multilateralism. Both solutions were 
practicable, each of them apporting an effective solution to the economic problem in the   18
kind  of  social  world  it  pertains  to.  To  put  it  differently,  multilateralism  was  practical 
policy  for  Britain  if,  and  only  if,  the  US  efficiently  demonstrated  its  willingness  to 
overcome the interwar impasse. Keynes was ready to make concessions to the American 
conception of the international economic system in return for US assistance, only if “the 
trade were freer, and international finance were managed, on a global basis” (Vines, 2003: 
346).  More  than  that,  “Keynes  clearly  believed  that  interdependence  required 
management, and that a ‘leader’ was a great asset (if not an essential one) in doing this” 
(Markwell, 1995: 209). The new leader should move from a “zero-sum game” image of the 
economic world, where member powers promote their particular interests whatever the 
cost for other countries – whatever the burden imposed upon them by the most dramatic 
aspects  of  the  economic  problem  –  and  improve  the  chances  of  a  generalized 
multilateralism by defending every country’s ability to endorse it. Keynes’s Schachtism 
was the safety corner for countries no more willing to tolerate the dramatic relationships 
of an international society dominated by the principle of scarcity and prone to find safety 
in closed worlds like that envisaged by Keynes himself in the 30s115.  
The ICU banking principle, “a piece of highly necessary business mechanism”116, 
was intended to establish harmonic relations between creditors and debtors of the kind of 
those which constituted the “great historical advantages”117 of the pre-war order. In his 
memorandum on post-war currency policy, Keynes asserted that a solution to the secular 
international problem had been found in the second half of the nineteenth century when 
“the system of international investment pivoting on London transferred the onus of the 
adjustment from the debtor to the creditor position”118. Changes in the volume of foreign 
investment by the creditors substituted for changes in price and wages as effects of gold 
flows;  loans  from  “old  established”  to  “newly-developing”  countries  were  “self-
liquidating because they themselves created new sources of payment”119. In the Thirties, 
on the contrary, a “complete degeneration set in and capital funds flowed from countries 
of which the balance of trade was adverse into countries where it was favourable”120. “The 
architects of a successful international system must be guided by these lessons”121, warned 
the same Keynes who in 1909 had expressed his admiration for the mutual benefits of 
foreign lending under the gold standard122 but less than twenty years later123, considering 
those between the nineteenth and the twentieth century as “false analogies”124, declared 
that  Britain  should  abandon  those  very  policies  to  pursue  its  national  interest  (see 
Hutchison, 1973).  
The ICU was to remedy the dilemmas of the international system as exposed in the 
Treatise 125, by transforming adherence to international discipline into a choice of freedom 
rather than necessity. The freedom to pursue interest rate and investment policies with a   19
view to assuring full employment, helping “ourselves and our neighbours at the same 
time”126, for a Keynesian world where “the simultaneous pursuit of these policies by all 
countries  together  [...]  is  capable  of  restoring  economic  health  and  strenght 
internationally”127. Schachtism could not secure this result for, as Keynes made clear in 
1942 to explain his preference for multilateralism, it may lead to a fallacy of composition: 
“[b]ilateralism may be all very well if one looks at it from the point of view of a single 
country pursuing it with enlightened self-interest. But as a world system with everyone 
playing at the game I am appalled at the complications and errors likely to arise”128. In the 
second draft of his plan129 he added that “Schachtian” countries would necessarily find in 
“a position of particular obligation towards others”130. As remarked by Williamson (1981), 
“Keynes  set  his  mind  to  devising  a  post-war  system  where  bilateralism  would  be 
unnecessary and multilateralism would again be practicable” (ib.: 542). Unlike laissez-faire 
and  its  purposiveness,  the  ICU  would  have  contributed  to  reducing  the  economic 
problem, doing what Schachtism can do only for countries belonging to the inner circle; 
yet “a system of general and collective responsibility, applying to all countries alike” can 
extend the device to the outer circle, placing emphasis on the virtues, rather than the vices, 
of economic interdependence. In a way, therefore, multilateralism is both the crux of the 
problem and its solution – “[e]verything else in the plan is ancillary to that”131, Keynes 
declared to the Lords – if only a general and collective responsibility for global imbalances 
can be assured by the help of the ICU.  
It is only apparently paradoxical, then, that Keynes had developed “a theory of how 
the system as a whole would behave” (Vines, 2003: 349) though starting from a national 
perspective (Newton, 2000): the ICU plan was the final result of the search for an order 
assuring national behaviours in harmony with the needs of the whole system. With its 
closed-economy  model  and  the  indication  of  two  opposite  alternatives  for  national 
behaviour,  the  zero-sum  game  of  mercantilism  and  the  twice-blessed  “Keynesian” 
solution, chapter 23 of the General Theory provided the model for rethinking the system as 
such. The awareness of Britain’s decline132 was obviously for Keynes the starting point for 
reconsidering the pattern of international interactions. Once a commitment towards a freer 
trade taken, the escape route for Britain – but here “Britain” is truly a synonym for deficit 
countries – required him to “remake the whole world” (Vines, 2003: 346). Hence Keynes’s 
proposals  for  raising  international  liquidity  in  line  with  world  trade  through  the ICU: 
fearing  that  world  economic  recovery  after  the  end  of the  war  might  lead  to  a global 
restraint, as well as that the US could make use of other means than increased domestic 
demand to sustain full employment, he envisaged a fully accommodating global monetary 
policy, so that the scarcity of medium cannot impede the growth of international trade133.   20
Moreover,  Keynes  worried  that  a  competitive  struggle  for  reserves  could  emerge,  a 
problem  he  had  referred  to  since  1932.  Hence  his  suggestion  for  fixed  but  adjustable 
exchanges and capital controls, with exchange policies free, under given circumstances, to 
point  at  internal  equilibrium.  Of  course,  reconsidering  the  adjustment  burden  was 
essential to the project, requiring creditor countries to act, at least initially, as the keystone 
of a scheme destined to force the international economic problem to take its back seat134. 
The  times  may  come,  Keynes  wrote  in  1945  echoing  his  Economic  Possibilities  for  Our 
Grandchildren,  when  “an  opportunity  to  get  rid  of  stuff  without  payment  [may seem]  a 
positive convenience”135 – in Keynes’s scheme there is no reward in being ‘good’, that is, in 
working hard and developing a trade surplus” (Mini, 1994: 194). Before entering that “age 
of abundance”  which will change “the nature of one’s duty to  one’s neighbour”136, “it 
would remain reasonable to be economically purposive for others after it has ceased to be 
reasonable for oneself” (ib.). At Bretton Woods, however, “[t]he U.S. negotiators operated 
with  certain  basic  preconceptions”,  says  Gardner  (1975:  203),  and  among  them  “the 
pervasive feeling that the U.S. was the world perennial surplus country and had to protect 
itself against too liberal access to international credits” (ib.: 206). Probably “victims of ‘an 
arrogance  of  power’”,  “they  hardly  imagined  that  the  U.S.  might  some  day  need 
international  assistance  in  dealing  with  its  own  payments  problems”  (ib.).  Only  after 
realizing  that  its  position  was  becoming  that  of  a  chronic  deficit  country,  the  US 
“reinvented  some  of  those  Keynesian  proposals  that  they  had  earlier  torpedoed” 
(Williamson, 1981: 543).  
 
4. KEYNES’S GIFT DIMENSION FOR THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
 
Defeated on the liquidity issue, but finally convinced, due both to his elasticity pessimism 
(Moggridge,  1992)  and  fear  of  a  generalization  of  protectionist  solutions,  of  the 
practicability  of  the  multilateral  agenda  of  Meade’s  plans  for  an  International  Trade 
Organization  (Vines,  2003),  Keynes  knew  that  Britain,  a  country  too  weak  to  enter  a 
financially  open  international  environment,  could  take  part  in  multilateralism  only  if 
guaranteed assistance from the US137. Hence the memorandum Overseas Financial Policy in 
Stage III with Keynes’s request to the US for a gift. To a first approximation,  it seems 
obvious that what we suggest calling the “American Gift” asked for by Keynes in 1945 has 
not yet gained the attention of the sociological and anthropological literature, nor it has 
been treated as such, i.e. as a gift, in the essays dealing with Keynes’s role in shaping the 
new international system. Since Washington offered a loan, though on easy terms, the 
American  Gift  is  quite  paradoxically  a  gift  with  no  giver. The  economic  literature  has   21
however provided more subtle arguments to oppose a gift-giving analysis of Keynes’s 
requests. Somehow reversing the dressing-up operation envisaged by British negotiators 
to transform the gift into a business-character assistance thus coming to term with the US 
business morals, historians have argued that the free grant Keynes asked for to the US was 
a strategic camouflage of the expected loan. Pressnell (1986) maintains that the American 
Gift was but an essential part of “the British tactic” (ib.: 264). In the context of the major 
meeting on 23 August 1945, destined to elaborate Britain’s approach to the negotiations, 
“[t]alk  of  an  outright  free  grant,  without  interest  and  non-repayable,  can  be  seen  to 
resemble  not  so  much  serious  beliefs  as  an  attractive  marker,  to  compare  the  most 
favourable possible outcome with the least favourable” (ib.: 265). It was agreed that an 
American proposal of generous assistance to Britain should appear from the strength of 
the British case itself, with no specific suggestions on the part of London: “[t]he aim was to 
seek at the outset, not unnaturally, preferred British goals” (ib.: 266), a free grant plus help 
to settle the sterling balances. “Subsequently, it would be unsurprising for the British so to 
manoeuvre that disagreeable terms, even if regarded as broadly reasonable in London, 
should nevertheless appear to be of American inspiration” (ib.). Due to the success of this 
tactic (see Ferrari Bravo, 1990: 370), Harrod and Gardner would have naïvely insisted on 
Keynes’s belief that a gift could really be obtained, and even on his ability to persuade 
Ministers and officials to share his supposed enthusiasm” (Pressnell, 1986: 266).  
  The  different  issues  at  stake  which  led  Keynes  to  his  six  missions  to  America 
between  1941  and  1946,  namely  “lend-lease,  Article  VII,  the  shape  of  the  post-war 
international  economic  order  and  Britain’s  initial  post-war  financial  settlement” 
(Moggridge, 2002: 117), were clearly interrelated – in particular, “the more generous the 
terms lend-lease were the less might Britain need at the end of the war in transitional 
assistance from the US” (ib.)138 –, the gift as a tactic seems to suit well to both Keynes’s 
fighting  interpretations,  either  “for”  or  “despite”  Britain.  Edward  Playfair’s  1941 
characterization of Keynes as a too proud or naïve negotiator – “I think he is inclined to 
ask as of right what they are only prepared to give us as a favour. It seems to me very 
important to keep moral indignation out of these discussions if we are to get anywhere” 
(in Moggridge, 1992: 657) is dismissed by Ferrari Bravo (1990) as follows: 
  
How  is  it  possible  [...]  that  that  “moral  indignation”  based  on  a  optimistic 
overvaluation – i.e. a wrong evaluation – of British financial situation in summer 
1941 had endured unchanged for four years? Four years of perseverance in the 
same error, that of asking  as of  right what the Americans consider a favour  appear 
definitely too many, and particularly so for a mind not so sensitive to the appeal of 
coherence (ib.: 272).   
   22
“Keynes [was] fully aware of the optimistic and moralistic part he plays with faultless 
effectiveness vis-à-vis the American negotiator” (ib.), he adds; but he had no disposable 
negotiation style other than, on the one side, the moralistic one and, on the other, that of 
“granting  his  interlocutor,  with  no  compensation, that  position  of  ‘moral  indignation’ 
which his country’s situation legitimated him to rely on, so as to find himself projected 
immediately  in  that  realm  of  utilitarian  considerations  towards  which  the  stronger 
financial counterpart tended to move” (ib.). The “ingenuity” causing Keynes to ground 
his request for a gift on Justice is here regarded as one of the few disposable weapons for 
his battle, and one to be used: Skidelsky’s criticisms of Keynes’s “moral” arguments is 
thus challenged on its ground, that is strategy.  
To avoid underestimating the strong continuity existing between Keynes’s request 
for assistance  in the  form of a gift rather than a loan and his overall views about the 
desired  global  order,  we  believe  it  necessary  to  conduct  an  inquiry  into  another 
dimension,  which  may  be  called  the  “gift  dimension”  of  Keynes’s  vision.  A  more 
appropriate  toolbox  is  needed  than  those  provided  by  the  limited  literature  on  the 
economic  necessity  of  gifts  in  modern  capitalism,  which  focuses  on  the  Lend  Lease 
Agreement and the Marshall Plan but denies relevance to the American Gift. The only 
reference to Keynes is included in Perroux’s (1992) work on the Marshall Plan: 
 
Lorsque Lord Keynes, dans l'admirable speech à la Chambre Haute, par lequel il 
défendit le loan anglo-américain, se déclarait inconsolable de n'avoir pu obtenir un 
crédit sans intérêt, il exprimait, bien sûr, sa déception de négociateur et ses regrets 
qu'un geste  américain n'ait pas rendu un plus substantiel hommage  à Londres, 
capital du courage libérateur. Il n'est pas interdit de penser que cette formule d'un 
grand esprit avait – comme c'est toujours le cas – plus d'un sens et devait être 
interprétée compte tenu de ses arrière-plans et de ses perspectives (ib.: 212). 
 
Our perspective heeds Perroux’s invitation to search for other explanations of Keynes’s 
disappointment  with  the  loan  than  those  exclusively  related  to  his  mission  as  British 
negotiator,  and  asks  the  anthropological  and  sociological literature  for  assistance, with 
particular reference to the bulk of studies about gift-giving which has been developing 
throughout the twentieth century and beyond since Marcel Mauss’s Essai sur le don139.  
 
4.1  POST-WAR (WOULD-BE) WORLDS  
 
At the beginning of 1944, Keynes outlined a plan to approach Britain’s financial difficulties 
in  the  transition  to  the  new  order.  By  that  time  he  had  become  “more  and  more 
enamoured of a general solution to the problem of the sterling balances as a part of the 
post-war  clean-up”  (Moggridge,  1992:  760).  Sterling  Area  creditors  had  accepted  to   23
centralize  their  exchange  reserves,  mainly  dollars,  in  London,  in  exchange  for  sterling 
accounts  whose  validity  was  restrained  to  the  area.  The  balances  had  been  growing 
abnormally with the accumulation of military expenditures made by Britain itself in those 
territories as well as with the reduction in exports. At the end of the war, the area would 
have registered an overall deficit: as a consequence, Keynes envisaged a “‘Sterling Area’ 
Solution for the Interim Period”140 showing significant discontinuities with the existing 
agreement,  to  the  disappointment  of  the  Bank  of  England.  Due  to  war  efforts  and  to 
traditional exports likely going to be “beaten by both the dear labour of America and by 
the cheap labour of Asia and Europe”141, the huge prospected deficit at the end of the war 
required  Britain  to  limit  initially  the  convertibility  of  the  sterling  balances  to  current 
earnings142 and to ask the Americans for assistance to the extent of two billion dollars143. 
That was not “a well-chosen moment for a declaration of our financial independence of 
North America”, as he later wrote144: given the difficulties of borrowing everywhere, the 
world  was  a  very  small  place,  as  the  Treasury  Representative  in  Washington,  Robert 
Brand, told Keynes during the negotiations strategies145. Keynes had firm beliefs about the 
form of the assistance “Lady Bountiful”146 should require to the US: “we should resist, I 
suggest, a market operation [...].  Such a credit should be regarded as a part of war finance. 
It should not carry interest and should be repayable by instalments over a period of (say) 
fifty  years”147.  Lacking  the  American  help,  Britain  should  renounce  taking  her 
responsibility  for  the  post-war  world.  Keynes  predicted  that  Washington  would  offer 
more than it was reasonable for Britain to accept, conditional to the adoption (“entirely, of 
course,  for  our  good”148)  of  the  “American  conception  of  the  international  economic 
system”149: “[i]t is not the quantity of the accommodation about which we need worry. It is 
the terms and the consequences of losing our financial independence which should deeply 
concern us”150. Should the US use once again Britain as a “conduit pipe of America credit 
to the rest of the world”151, he remarked, it would be better to decline the whole offer.  
  The Lend Lease agreements for Stage II152 left Keynes overoptimistic about the US 
“deepest,  least  alterable  conviction”,  namely  that  a  “stable,  healthy  and  competitively 
strong” Britain was “a vital, indeed an indispensable, requirement of American policy”153. 
While launching the “education campaign”154 to persuade the north American continent to 
sustain Britain, Keynes called for a “new approach”155 on both parts, since none of the 
“international  credit  mechanisms,  in  existence  or  contemplated”156,  could  provide  a 
sustainable  solution  to  Britain’s  troubles.  “What  will  be  needed  will  be  an  act  of 
statesmanship, perhaps on the initiative of the President himself just as he introduced the 
concept of lend lease at a time when some entirely new idea was necessary in order to 
ensure that we should go on fighting the war”; Britain should ask for “a reconsideration of   24
the sharing of the costs of the war. To the least possible extent, if at all, should it contain 
any normal provision”157. 
  The keystone of the American Gift saga is the memorandum Overseas Financial 
Policy in Stage III, a document against the status quo (Ferrari Bravo, 1990), offering the 
government  imaginative  alternatives  to  isolationism  and  austerity158.  Keynes  proudly 
stated  that  in  persuading  London’s  creditors  to  lend  her  3  billions  sterling  for  the 
conducting of the war lay one of the greatest successes in Britain’s history159. Lacking the 
American relief, anyway, Schachtian devices would provide the only solution for Britain’s 
post-war  debt  amounting  at  £2,000  million.  The  alternative  named  “Starvation  Corner” 
required Britain to adjust unilaterally through austerity and rationing, national planning 
and trade controls, i.e. “not merely the acceptance but the advocacy [...] of a system of 
international economy after the war of a kind to which all sections of opinion, not only in 
the  United  States  but  also  in  Canada,  are  bitterly  opposed”160.  Though  strategically 
relevant, the Starvation Corner was a desperate-best option, since multilateral, not bilateral, 
trade was in Britain’s interests: “[i]s not the use of our position as a great consumer, to force 
our goods out on to the world in return for what the world wishes to sell us, the only new 
weapon  in  our  armoury  and  one  we  cannot  do  without?”161.  However,  there  was  an 
alternative: “a general re-consideration of the proper burden of the costs of the war”162. 
Keynes  named  it  “Justice”,  but  was  careful  to  present  the  plan  only  after  a  passionate 
discussion  of  an  only  apparently  similar  option,  “Temptation”,  which  embodied  his 
concerns about the likelihood of Britain’s being had by the US through a settlement on 
unsustainable terms. The US could lend between 5 and 8 billion dollars at the maximum; 
the  latter  amount,  Keynes  conceded,  would  have  granted  London  a  “real  liberty  of 
action”163 and the possibility “to offer from the start the full multilateralism of trade and 
exchange  which  will  be  the  best  inducement  to  the  Americans  to  fall  in  with  our 
proposals”164. Keynes predicted that “the Americans would be ready, and even eager, to 
lend  us  large  sums  on  their  own  terms”165,  compelling  London  to  an  immediate  free 
multilateral  clearing  within  the  Sterling  Area  and  to  dismantle  the  Empire.  Besides 
expressing  concerns  for  a  further,  huge,  debt  in  addition  to  the  existing  ones,  Keynes 
believed it right to reject an agreement on such lines: “[t]he sweet breath of Justice between 
partners, in what had been a great and magnanimous enterprise carried to overwhelming 
success,  would  have  been  sacrificed  to  some  false  analogy  of  ‘business’”166,  just  as  it 
happened at the end of WWI with the American Debt settlement. In trying to obtain Justice, 
Britain should resist the American-friendly Temptation, he argued, strategically preparing 
herself to proudly and voluntarily accept the Starvation Corner.   25
  Justice would have allowed Britain to be the Americans’ partner “in setting up a 
post-war international economy of the character on which they have set their hearts”167. 
The US should have granted $3,000 million as a sort of retrospective Lend Lease agreement, 
thus falling in with Keynes’s hopes for a non-market solution to the imbalance. Moreover, 
Keynes was asking the US and Canada for relevant credit lines – $5 billion and $500 million 
respectively – at easy conditions. In exchange, London would have assured the de facto 
convertibility  of  the  sterling,  after  approaching  its  Sterling  Area  creditors  with  creative 
proposals for sharing the war burden according to a tripartite programme of eliminating 
(£880  million),  funding  (£1500  million)  and  freeing  (£750  million)  the  balances.  “In 
determining the respective size of the three portions each country could be dealt with on its 
merits”168: the “number of good reasons”169 for which Britain had had to accept “a post-war 
financial burden entirely disproportionate to what is fair”170 included not only the fact that 
the US had entered the war later than Britain, but also that the Dominions had de facto 
profited from British war expenditures.  
Though  little  investigated171,  the correspondence between  Keynes  and  Robert H. 
Brand in spring 1945, centred on Overseas Financial Policy in Stage III, is a fundamental step 
towards the definition of Britain’s strategy for the negotiations. For Brand, Britain should 
avoid insisting on claiming that “what we propose is not only Justice to us, but also Justice 
for them”172; the Americans would not have tolerated Keynes’s criticisms for the late entry 
of US army into the war. Keynes was asking the US for a gift, he added, because they were 
the only who could help Britain; what is more, they had a strong interest to do so. Due to 
the generosity they had shown with the Lend-Lease, the Americans could in effect talk 
about justice, while Britain was not in such a position. Since “[i]f they were to give [a gift as 
a retrospective Lend-Lease], the Americans would certainly regard it as an act, not of justice, 
but of generosity”173, the request of “something that looked a little less like a free gift”174 
would have been a better strategy. Keynes disagreed on the point: Justice would appeal to 
some people at least, he claimed, though self-advantages of the US in complying with the 
proposal should be emphasized too. Lacking the gift, Britain could not reach a satisfactory 
settlement with its sterling creditors and guarantee “that measure of convertibility, which 
is  the  main  prize  [the  Americans]  can  attain  by  falling  in  with  our  ideas”175.  With  the 
approval of the Bretton Woods agreement, Brand had wrote, Britain was believed to have 
finally settled its financial problems, to which Keynes replied that “nothing would suit us 
better  than  the  rejection  of  Bretton  Woods”176.  But  Britain  was  bound  to  respect  the 
agreement and its commitment towards free trade, he stated; rather, the gift was a strictly 
necessary condition for keeping up with the promise. The argument was thus reversed: 
since “[t]he various elements in the policy of trying to march with the U.S. in the post-war   26
economic set-up all hang together”177, only a gift “would enable us to march with them 
side by side”178 towards a new world. Market solutions would on the contrary led Britain 
to envisage “distasteful” second-best policies, which would be “objectionable”179 to the US, 
to face the transition. Prophetically, Keynes added: “[v]arious versions of Temptation”, 
with the risk of an “unbalanced settlement” hidden behind them, “will always be lying 
round the corner”180. 
Keynes  was  firm  on  the  need  to  reject  “anything  in  the  nature  of  a  specific 
bargain”181. To Sir Wilfrid Eady, Keynes wrote that Brand was right when warning that  
 
“references to justice should be avoided, but only up to a point. The appeal to 
justice does not necessarily suggest any lack of generosity on the part of U.S. It is a 
wider conception about the way in which the financial consequences of the war 
should be liquidated. Just as he thinks that this sort of line of approach is to be 
avoided, so I, on the other hand, think that too exclusive an appeal to American 
self-interest will be misjudged”182.  
 
Since the US was a “business country where it is a moral duty and not merely a self-
regarding act to make any money which the traffic will bear and the law allow”, as he later 
wrote  in  a  memorandum  to  Hugh  Dalton,  “some  imitation  of  a  normal  banking 
transaction is necessary if the moral principles of the country are not to be affronted”183. 
But a bargain, certainly not a specific one, could be said to exist only between the gift and 
the acceptance by Britain of “the kind of post-war world”184 wanted by the Americans too, 
which “they would fail to get, here and now”185, if refusing to offer the gift. Brand had 
suggested  a  metaphor  for  Great  Britain,  that  of  a  company  to  be  drastically 
reconstructed186; the US could likely request to be reassured about the participation of the 
sterling area members to the reconstruction of the country187. Keynes argued that doubts of 
this kind, on the American part, could reveal an advantage for Britain: it could be settled, 
for instance, that “the $3 billion from the U.S. should be matched by cancellations by the 
sterling creditors of an at least equal amount”188. But Brand had already objected that the 
portion of the balances (25%) Britain was to make immediately convertible would have 
been remitted to the US from countries like India and Egypt, thus depriving London of 2 
billion sterling. In any case, he added, “[t]he $3 billion free gift is indeed the crux of the 
problem, and the core of the whole plan. My own feeling is that a free gift will in any 
circumstances  be  extraordinarily  difficult  to  obtain.  At  any  rate  it  would  require  an 
atmosphere totally different from anything like the present one”189. 
Keynes’s response is worthy of careful consideration. As concerns the sterling area, 
he  remarked  that  the  “de  facto  convertibility”  program  was  conceived  to  induce  the 
sterling area countries to keep their deposits in London, since Britain was committed to 
allow the area members to draw gold and foreign exchange for current transactions as   27
well as to guarantee the convertibility of remaining sterling balances within three years190. 
Moreover,  a  “Starvation  Corner”  solution  for  the  sterling  area  agreements,  causing  an 
insane competition between the area members to get dollar allocations and among other 
creditors  to  throw  on  their  partners  as  much  as  possible  of  the  aggregate  burden  of 
Britain’s borrowing needs, would have turned against the interests of the US191. In sum, 
the dollar pool was the only means to assure the US that dollars would be spent, involving 
a minimum level of discrimination, while the additional 5 billion dollars loan were to be 
used as a last resort guaranteeing Britain the confidence necessary to face the transition. 
Keynes was aware of the cruciality of the gift: while trying to reassure Brand on both the 
issue  of  the  area  members’  sustain  to  the  dollar  pool  and  on  convertibility,  Keynes’s 
programme relying on Britain being granted the American Gift192, he brought forward two 
non-economic arguments supporting the idea of the gift as an “opening gambit”193. First, 
the plan would be much more acceptable to public opinion in Britain. Second, and more 
importantly, the gift would facilitate the task of persuading the sterling area countries to 
fall in with the proposal.  
 
“If America insists on remaining on a strictly economic basis, that makes it harder 
for  the  others  to  depart  from  it.  I  attach  predominant  importance  to  this 
psychological atmosphere of the free gift”194. 
 
“We  could  [...]  use  all  your  arguments  about  the  psychological  effect  on  our  sterling 
creditors,  about  the  immense  benefit  to  the  U.S.  from  our  joining  the  ranks  of  the 
convertible and so on. At very small cost they would be making a new world”195, Brand 
replied.  However,  soon  afterwards  he  recognized  that  “[w]hatever  we  may  say,  the 
Americans will always regard it as a great act of generosity on their part, for which we 
must always be grateful. There may be in fact little difference between a gift and a loan on 
exceedingly easy terms, but it will always be considered that there is a difference”196. As 
the Canadians told Keynes in London, between 19 and 29 March, the Americans were 
“shy of acting as a permanent Christmas tree”197. On 25 June 1945, the newly-appointed 
Assistant Secretary of State Clayton wrote to Vinson, who was to be named Secretary of the 
Treasure, that the US would offer but a loan, though at easy terms, to Britain, since “[i]t 
would be quite unwise… to consider making Britain an outright gift... It would be unwise 
even to supply the funds as credit without laying down conditions that would insure a 
sound advance towards our post-war objectives”198. The crucial meeting of 23 August 1945 
saw  Brand’s  views  about  the  need  to  let  the  gift  be  proposed  by  the  Americans  on 
consideration  of  the  “strength  of  our  case”  commanding  a  consensus  in  the  British 
mission199.  Keynes  had  became  convinced  that  the  Americans  would  “not  readily 
understand  the  honourable  character  of  our  obligations  to  many  of  the  sterling  area   28
countries”200;  on  5  September  he  recognized  that  “[t]here  will  have  to  be  some 
camouflage”201. Britain simply lacked an alternative to negotiate202, as Keynes had referred 
to Eady. To obtain the gift, British negotiators should have exhibited another one, “‘the gift 
of breaking off’, and be ready, if necessary, to come home unsuccessful”203. They were not, 
and they could not, as Graham Towers was to observe, since “to break off because we 
could not get a grant-in-aid would lay us open to great criticism by the public here”204. It is 
hard to complain for not receiving a gift which had not been given. 
“In the extreme limit where the U.S.A. has complete priority”, Keynes admitted, 
“the  whole  scheme  for  releasing  the  sterling  area  balances  would  be  frustrated.  It  is 
therefore in the general interest to go as near as is politically practicable to the opposite 
extreme”205.  As  a  consequence,  in  their  Press  Conference  at  the  British  Embassy  in 
Washington on 12 September, Keynes and Halifax, the British Ambassador, insisted on the 
concept of economic interdependence: “the financial and commercial arrangements of a 
considerable section of the world have become almost inextricably intertwined with our 
own financial and economic affairs in London”206, which required Britain to be “in a strong 
enough position to release to [our partners and creditors] as available purchasing power 
some  part  of  [their  external]  resources”207.  Keynes  prompted  for  a  cooperative  and 
imaginative solution to promote multilateralism and opposed Temptation. He added: 
 
We have to look at the financial and commercial problem of the world as a whole; 
and, moreover, build up a currency and commercial structure which is in the best 
interest not only of world prosperity (which our technicians will make easy) but of 
peace  and  goodwill  amongst  men  [...]  so  as  to  avoid  the  violent  disturbance  of 
international commerce which are the road to discontents which can shake the social 
order and to maintain full employment and good wages everywhere by means that 
do not beggar but, on the contrary, enrich our neighbours”208.  
 
However, “it was simply too difficult to keep the Sterling Area together (which required 
convertibility and free movement of capital within the area), keep sterling inconvertible 
into non-area currencies, keep the sterling/dollar rate at the pre-war parity, ignore the 
existence of a free market for sterling in New York (unfettered by US authorities), and, at 
the same time, declare a date in the near future for the return to convertibility” (De Cecco, 
1979b: 57). In November Keynes offered Vinson his last original scheme, asking the US for 
two  different  loans:  an  interest-bearing  loan  to  be  used  by  Britain  to  face  its  negative 
balance of payments vis-à-vis the US; and an interest-free one to promote multilateralism 
and  free  trade  in  the  general  interest  of  the  system,  involving  the  whole  spectrum  of 
Britain’s creditors in the adjustment. Only a clear and effective distinction between the 
terms of the two loans would persuade London to be “the channel through which that 
assistance is provided”209. Keynes could support the conclusion that “[i]n asking for such   29
assistance therefore, we are seeking something which will benefit not only the U.K. but the 
whole of the world, and not least the U.S.A. itself”210. But the US had already took its 
decision.  “Nabob  177”,  which  Keynes  sent  to  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  Hugh 
Dalton, in the most dramatic phase of the negotiations, sums up the logics inspiring his 
diplomacy:  
 
We  came  here  in  hope  that  we  could  persuade  the  U.S.  to  accept  a  broad  and 
generous solution which took account of our financial sacrifices before U.S. entered 
the war and of President Roosevelt’s principle of equality of sacrifice as well as of 
the post-war advantages to the U.S. of a settlement with us which would enable us 
to share world responsibilities with them free from undue financial pre-occupation 
and to join them in shaping the pattern of world commerce and currency on lines 
which would favour expansion and general prosperity. We thought of such aid as 
being  at  the  best  a  free  grant,  failing  that  a  partial  grant,  and  at  the  worst  an 
interest-free loan. A settlement on any of these lines would be intelligible to the 
British public as being free from commercial considerations and a grand gesture of 
unforgetting regard to us from a partner with whom our comradeship in the war 
has been of a very special intimacy. The difference between a settlement on any of 
these  lines  and  one  which  tries  to  imitate,  however  feebly,  a  normal  banker’s 
investment  is  much  greater  than  is  represented  by  any  increase  in  our  future 
financial burden211.  
 
The final agreement was on a 3.75 billions dollar loan on easy terms; its last instalment 
was corresponded by Britain on December the 31st, 2006212. 
 
4.2  THE SPIRAL OF THE GIFT 
 
Keynes’s  insistence  on  the  multilateral  character  of  the  desired  new  order,  easing  the 
moving  towards  a  sounder  political  economy between  all nations,  is at  odds  with  the 
“Fighting  for  Britain”  narrative.  Moggridge  (2002)  rightly  points  out  that  Skidelsky’s 
volume undervalues the importance of Keynes’s plans for the settlement of the sterling 
balances.  The  moving  from  the  Starvation  Corner  towards  Justice,  passing  through 
Temptation, can be explained by referring to the increased number of players involved in 
the  passage  to  a  more  equilibrated  world.  The  Starvation  Corner  was  a  synonym  for 
unilateral adjustment, Britain being compelled to put its house in order without external 
assistance. Temptation would have involved the US in the correction. Justice would have 
given Britain the possibility to come to an agreement with the Sterling Area countries. The 
starting mechanism for the progressive enlargement of the spectrum of the participants in 
the adjustment was to be provided for by the American Gift. The analogy with Keynes’s 
proposals for rehabilitating Europe at the end of WWI is striking. In both cases, creditors 
were  required  to  share  the  adjustment  burden  with  debtors,  after  a  substantial  and   30
voluntary  effort  on  the  part  of  the  main  creditor,  the  US,  had  triggered  a  spiral  of 
generosity which, by progressively cancelling or mitigating the Inter-Allied debts, could 
help dramatic interdependence to transform into a win-win game for peace times. Overseas 
Financial  Policy  in  Stage  III  equally  aimed  at  reviving  global  multilateralism213.  Sterling 
Area countries had a real interest in complying with the settlement proposed by Keynes, 
offering  them  the  opportunity  to  revitalize  their  exchanges  with  the  US  without 
repudiating the agreements with Britain. Moreover, due to Britain’s difficulties, they only 
could act as stimulators for American exports; while the US did not depend on external 
trade as much as Britain, the world did depend primarily on US home trade (De Cecco, 
1979b).  Thus,  Keynes’s  “shared  responsibilities”  scheme  included  a  solution  for  global 
imbalances which could hold together the main trade partners of the world and let them 
regain  confidence  to  take  part  in  global  multilateralism.  The  transformation  of  the 
American  Loan  finally  negotiated  into  a  non-British  demand  for  American  goods, 
accelerating the path towards the 1947 sterling convertibility crisis, which was to show, ex 
post, that Keynes’s concerns were not misplaced.  
The somewhat surprising involvement of a third actor in a process which has been 
mostly  looked  at  as  a  bilateral  relationship  should  remind  scholars  familiar  with  the 
anthropological literature of the long debated issue of the hau, or “the spirit of the thing 
given”,  a  concept  deriving  from  the  account  of  Elsdon  Best’s  Taori  informant  Tamati 
Ranaipiri214  and  used  by  Mauss  to  explain  the  obligation  to  reciprocate.  A  convincing 
revisitation  of  the  hau  has  been  provided  by  Sahlins  (1972)  and  later  Hyde  (1983), 
assimilating it to the productivity of the gift215. Sahlins sees the Essai sur le don as an essay 
on the social contract, the gift being engaged in a war with war itself: archaic societies 
simply do not permit the beneficiary of a present to get rich because of the gift itself, 
which must be returned, or it ceases to be fertile216. Gifts exchange thus become a synonym 
for the contrat politique, “the exchange of everything between everybody” substituting for 
“Hobbes’s war of every man against every man” (Sahlins, 1972: 168)217; gift is “Reason” 
(ib.: 175), organizing  society as a milieu of “in between” relations with “no sacrifice of 
equality and never of liberty” (ib.: 170)218. Due to human  passions, however, reason is 
insufficient, and requires reciprocity as a law, i.e. the obligation to repay, as the mechanism 
for social stability. With respect to Levi-Strauss219, Sahlins argues, “Mauss transposes the 
classic alternatives of war and trade from the periphery to the very centre of social life, 
and from the occasional episode to the continuous presence” (ib.: 182). The third person in 
Ranaipiri’s account is thus  interpretable as a possible key to understand at least some 
aspects of the systemic character of gifts as “total social phenomena” (Mauss, 1990: 3): 
“[t]he cycling gift system is the society” (Douglas, 1990: ix). As remarked by Godbout   31
(1998a), the hau does not appear in bilateral relationships, “but only in those which there 
are many partners in a chain, creating a complex path. [The hau] is coextensive with the 
generalized gift” (ib.: 130-131).  
Not to separate the three elements, giving, receiving and reciprocating, since the 
insistence on one of them taken by itself risks imposing a “mercantile reciprocity” view of 
gift-giving,  Godbout  (1998a)  suggests  using  the  metaphor  of  a  spiral  to  represent  the 
dynamic of the gift. That way, he assigns anyway a prominent role to giving as its starting 
mechanism: only a gift, in fact, can give life to something new, unexpected, irreducible to 
what the actors involved possessed before entering such a relation (see Fixot, 1992)220. This 
dynamics  is  indeed  based  on  a  “strange  law  of  alternation”  (ib.:  134),  requiring  the 
receiver of a gift not so much to reciprocate, but to offer himself. In general terms, the gift 
reverses the principle of revenge and precedes reciprocity, since one gives not to someone 
who  has  previously  given,  but  to  somebody  who  will  give  (Anspach,  2002).  Wrongly 
dismissed by a relevant part of the current literature on gift-giving221, in that following the 
“principle of give and take” correction Malinowski’s (1996) apported to his Argonauts of the 
Western Pacific (1922) to focus on purely reciprocal gifts (see Hyde, 1983; Parry, 1986), gifts 
circularity in kula rings suggests that “harmonious, stable relationships are more likely to 
occur, and strain to be reduced, when a system is worked out by which everybody can be 
a potential donor” (Dillon, 2004: 15). By opposing the principle of revenge in the highly 
heterogeneous  world  of  archaic  societies  studied  by  Mauss,  whose  stability  is 
continuously threatened by the antagonistic relationships which derive from inequality, 
the gift create social bonds which are functional to the creation and maintenance of peace. 
The spontaneousness of the gift is obligatory, since while impersonal market equivalence 
reduce  the  specificity  of  different  and  unique  social  relationships  to  the  uniformity  of 
interchangeable actors who live outside history, gifts only are able to prevent anti-social 
mechanisms from operating.  
This is the result emerging from the theoretical path traced by the sociologist Alvin 
Gouldner to analyse reciprocity and gift-giving in modern societies. In 1960, Gouldner had 
claimed that the “norm of reciprocity”222 is a universal “all-purpose moral cement” (ib.: 64)  
playing a stabilizing role in transactions unregulated by specific status obligation. Once 
internalized by the parties, the norm of reciprocity would thus provide the confidence 
necessary  to  solve  “prisoner’s  dilemma”  situations.  However,  he  recognized,  there  are 
problems in too exclusively an insistence on the norm of reciprocity, which relies indeed 
on  making  it  inconvenient,  for  both  creditors  and  debtors,  to  break  off  dependence 
relationships: the “shadow of indebtedness” (ib.: 63) is functional to social stability223. In a 
subsequent essay, Gouldner (1973) noted that the role of the norm in sensitizing people to   32
the future is far from sure224. The principle of justice is a necessary condition for social 
stability  but  it  is  not  sufficient,  he  argued,  not  least  because  of  the  initial  “disparity 
between  the  wants  or  needs  of  different  persons  and  their  culturally  prescribed  status 
right” (ib.). A solution is found in the “norm of beneficence” (ib.: 266), or the principle of 
“something for nothing”, which requires men “to give others such help as they need” (ib.). 
While reciprocity is “the defensive and minimal demand of the world-chastened adult 
who can and is willing to give – or, at least, to settle for – of ‘something for something’ (ib.: 
268), something for nothing is “a mechanism for stopping vicious cycles of social interaction” 
(ib.: 274), for preventing failures to comply with reciprocity from generating retaliation 
and war. The principle thus serves  
 
“as a ‘starting mechanism’ helping to initiate social interaction [being] an ignition 
key that activates the starting engine (the norm of reciprocity) which, in turn, gets 
the motor – the ongoing cycle of mutual exchanges – to turn over” (ib.: 275).  
 
As seen, the American Gift as conceived by Keynes was to exhibit a spiral movement 
involving  all  major  partners  of  the  future  world  in  the  liquidation  of  the  financial 
consequences of the war and, above all, in the construction of a new multilateral order 
contributing  to  solving  the  international  economic  problem.  Its  “starting  mechanism” 
character for an “ongoing cycle of mutual exchanges” substituting for the impasse of the 
interwar period appears with clarity once the American Gift is considered in its aspects of 
continuity with Keynes’s overall reform projects and their systemic character. Keynes had 
underlined with force that the American intervention to rehabilitate Europe at the end of 
the conflict should come as a part of a “general responsibility” plan, the US being required 
to let other countries dispose of its redundant surplus in a more systematic way, “as Great 
Britain used to do in the past”. As remarked by Mini (1994), the ICU was a true “break 
with the past” (ib.: 193) was in condemning the accumulation of surplus as an anti-social 
and actually useless act of purposiveness which pertains to rentier nations225. In principle, 
and at the outset a part of Keynes’s general reform plans, the American Gift became a 
substitute,  though  an  imperfect  one,  for  them:  the  requested  American’s  help,  Keynes 
wrote, cost them “literally nothing. It enables them to dispose over a period of a foreign 
surplus far below what they are likely in any case to develop, a surplus of which in any 
case they will have to find means of riddance”226. The true value of the American Gift is 
not in being the most visible part of the “automatic surrender of surpluses” considered by 
critics of the ICU plan as the latter’s essence, but in the possibility to use it as a trigger 
mechanism for the re-launching of multilateralism to the benefit of the whole world, the 
Americans included. Since the Bretton Woods agreement, too gentle towards the creditors 
and too little elastic in its providing facilities with respect to international trade, could play   33
a lesser role than the ICU in realizing a more equilibrated world, the only seemingly “back 
to bilateralism” proposal of the American Gift may be conceived as a sort of tester of the 
leadership’s willingness to comply with the revolutionary spirit of Keynes’s desired new 
system despite the rejection of his “freedom-enhancing” proposals at Bretton Woods (see 
Cedrini, 2007).  
According to Ferrari Bravo (1990),  
 
 “[Keynes’s] main concern will be […] that of conciliating the financial transfer, the 
financial millenium, with his country’s international political position. The constant 
of his action is the attempt to imbue the new hegemonic centre, the US, with the 
behaviour and ethics which pertains to the world creditor power” (ib.: 407).  
 
“[P]assionately convinced” as he was “of the need for an international economic order of 
some  form,  and  especially  of  having  the  country  whose  economy  then  dominated  the 
world accept its international responsibilities” (Williamson, 1983: 101), Keynes was bound 
to devise other mechanisms, since Bretton Woods had taken the form of a revised White 
plan,  to  obtain  this  result.  Not  only  Britain’s  enormous  indebtedness  in  the  transition 
period,  but  also  Keynes’s  defeats  on  increased  international  liquidity,  on  his  “shared 
responsibilities”  plans  for  international  imbalances,  substituted  for  by  the  “subscribed 
capital” principle of White’s plan, on the technical rather than political character of the 
institutions’ mandate to safeguard national autonomy from the bias in favour of discipline 
which marked their birth, on the creation of a new supranational money dethronizing 
gold and the dollar in their role of international reserve all lay at the basis of the American 
Gift;  in  short,  on  all  his  freedom-enhancing  proposals. In  this  sense, Overseas  Financial 
Policy in Stage III was really “a trigger mechanism for the creation of a Keynesian world” 
(Newton, 2000: 199). 
The ICU world has many elements in common with those social contracts based on 
a mixture of gift-giving and reciprocity which scholars carrying on Mauss’s analyses see at 
the basis of peaceful social relations in archaic societies. The interwar period had shown 
clearly that stability cannot be assured by market mechanisms alone: countries, and even 
the leader, can simply decline responsibility for an orderly-managed international system. 
To use Sahlins’s (1972) well-known, somewhat paradigmatic “reciprocity continuum”227, 
one could argue that the international system as conceived by Keynes is supposed to leave 
aside  “negative  reciprocity”  of  the  interwar  period  –  participants  in  the  exchange 
“confront[ing] each  other  as  opposed  interests,  each  looking  to maximize  utility at the 
other’s expense” (ib.: 195), like in the mercantilist world described in the General Theory228 – 
to endorse the “balanced reciprocity” typical of orders where social relationships depend 
on material flows, the classic vehicle of peace and alliance contracts, substance-as-symbol   34
of  the  transformation  from  separate  to  harmonious  interests”  (ib:  220).  Balanced-
reciprocity systems do not tolerate huge, persistent imbalances229; but reciprocity cannot be 
perfectly balanced, or it gives life to an instable system perpetually tending towards the 
one or the other of the extremes of the continuum. To avoid falling back to its “negative” 
pattern,  balanced  reciprocity  must  be  supplemented  by  sanction  or  progressively 
approach positive reciprocity. The former is the task Keynes assigned to the ICU through 
its  “shared  responsibilities”  principles,  demanding  creditor  countries  to  submit  to  the 
obligation not to impose deflationary pressures on other economies. A normal piece of 
“highly necessary business mechanism” in national economies, the banking principle is 
revolutionary once placed in the international setting regarded as a closed system, since it 
required its members to comply with the requirements of global interdependence; and the 
American Gift fully represents this revolution toward positive reciprocity. 
But the US was not disposed, to say it à la Gouldner (1973), to take conscience of the 
“precariousness of their own future position, however secure they may be at the moment” 
(ib.: 261). The ICU plan was implicitly based on the player with all the cards in his hands 
taking advantage from Britain’s “experience” and imbuing its leadership with a “public 
spirit”. On requesting the American Gift, Keynes was suggesting that the US could not 
continue pursuing its isolationist policy: with n-1 countries caught in the dilemmas of the 
international  system,  the  n-th  country,  the  leader,  should  find  the  means  to  actively 
promote the formers’ participation in the new order. Noblesse oblige, notes Gouldner: the 
empirical pattern of interaction between norms of beneficence and reciprocity lies in the 
leaders’ compliance with the former being “a symbolic token of their responsibility and, 
hence, of their basic credentials for power and leadership in the group”, where leadership 
is “defined as acting in conformity with the needs or interests of the group as a whole, rather 
than on behalf of the leader’s own partisan interests alone” (ib.: 278)230. 
 
4.3  FREEDOM TO CHOOSE AND OBLIGATION TO ACCEPT 
 
Being their prolongation but also a different, and more limited, to a certain extent, vehicle 
of their spirit, the American Gift necessarily acquires some specificities with respect to 
Keynes’s previous reform plans. The insistence on the gift itself, seemingly a “back to” a 
“patchwork”231 solution for global imbalances as opposed to the “system of general and 
collective  responsibility”  which  Keynes  devised  as  a  more  attractive  alternative  to  the 
former, seem to assign to the American Gift those peculiar characteristics which studies on 
Mauss’s legacy for today’s world recognize as typical of the gift in modern, utilitarian 
societies. It is the case of the analyses carried out since the Eighties by scholars gathered   35
around  La  Revue  du  MAUSS,  in  the  attempt  to  overcome,  by  developing  a  “third 
paradigm”, that of the gift, in an anti-utilitarian framework, the traditional dualities in 
sociology  between  individualism  and  holism  (Caillé,  1998)  and  between  utilitarian 
calculation  and  adherence  to  norms  or  values  (Adloff  and  Mau,  2006).  The  “double 
impossibility” in which the gift is caught in modern societies (Caillé, 1998) – it cannot be 
derived from egoism, nor it can be purely altruistic or divine –  parallels the impossibility 
to  explain  the  genesis  of  social bonds  starting both  from  normative  approaches to the 
theory  of  reciprocity,  which  simply  take  them  for  granted,  and  methodological 
individualism,  unable  to  assess  how  social  cooperation  can  emerge  from  risk-averse, 
utility-maximizing  individuals.  Modernity  renounces  to  the  complexity  of  the  gift  by 
defining it through one and only one of its various components232. “Modern times begin 
with the decision to split entirely and without hope of return what the ancient societies 
had  tried  to  hold  together  –  namely,  the  sacred  and  the  profane,  gods  and  men,  the 
political  and  the  economic,  splendour  and  calculation,  friendship  and  war,  gift  and 
interest” (ib.: 23), thus engendering the paradox of the free gift:  
 
“[t]here is no gift more certain to command attention than the gift that need not 
have been given because of our past indebtedness, our future ambitions, or our 
present sense of obligation. [...] there is no gift that brings a higher return than the 
free gift, the gift given with no strings attached. (Gouldner, 1973: 277).  
 
The first gift, noted Simmel (1996), “because it was first, has a voluntarily character which 
no return gifts can have. For, to return the benefit we are obliged ethically. […] We are 
apparently free to do or not to do the duty [of gratitude] we feel above us as an ideal; but, 
actually, complete freedom exists only in regard to not doing it, since to do it follows from 
a psychic  imperative,  [...] the inner equivalent of the legal coercion of society (ib.: 47). 
However, as stressed by Douglas (1990),  
 
There should not be any free gifts. What is wrong with the so-called free gift is the 
donor’s  intention  to  be  exempt  from  return  gifts  coming  from  the  recipient. 
Refusing requital puts the act of giving outside any mutual ties. [...] A gift that does 
nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction. (ib.: vii)  
 
A major reason why economists fail to “import” the gift from anthropology and sociology, 
the “between” character of the gift relationship (see Zenou et al., 1993) with its paradoxical 
mix  of  voluntary  giving  and  obligation  to  give  seems  to  be  lost  in  modern  societies.  
Godbout (1998) argues that with the advent of the market, the invention of surplus and the 
separation between production and consumption, producer and user, things no longer 
circulate  carrying  social  ties  with  them;  the  latter  simply  leave  relationships  based  on 
economic  dependence  and  take  refuge  in  primary  sociality  (family,  kinship,  village),   36
untouched by the market. Entering the realm of community ties and progressively but 
somewhat inexorably dismantling communities by substituting their service institutions 
for  primary  relationships,  the  state’s  intermediaries  later  complete  the  rupture  with 
archaic  societies,  and  almost  totally  free  men  from  social  ties  themselves.  Hence  the 
dissociation  between  utility  and  gratuity:  obligation  and  freedom,  self-interest  and 
disinterest, elements held together and interwoven in the complex architecture of archaic 
gifts,  are  now  seen  as  competing  principles.  An  almost  completely  utilitarian  society 
leaves no room but to a pure gift and its ideology (Parry, 1986)233. It is then an easy task for 
modern minds to deny the gift even the possibility to exist, since they cannot conceive a 
purely altruistic action unless it can be related to egoistic motivations. But this is a logical 
impossibility, as already remarked by Durkheim (see Caillé, 2001) and illustrated by what 
Godbout  calls  “the  paradox  of  Carnegie”.  To  win  friends  and  prosper,  a  businessman 
must  be  interested  in  others;  however,  his  success  depends  on  being  genuinely  so:  he 
should not exploit instrumentally such interest, or he will not succeed. As Derrida (1992) 
shows, however, the “gift as gift” (ib.: 14), the anti-economic gift requires “that the donee 
not give back, amortize, reimburse, acquit himself, enter into a contract, and that he never 
contracted a debt” (ib.: 13). But then, if experience shows that the real gift is an “Indian” 
gift, “for which an equivalent return is expected” (Parry, 1986: 455), the latter is but a mask 
of the “most basic Law of economics, namely that one cannot get something for nothing” 
(Harrod, 1948: 36). “At the limit”, says Derrida, “the gift as gift ought not appear as gift: 
either to the donee or to the donor” (Derrida, 1992: 14): the gift is “the very figure of the 
impossible” (ib.: 7). A major problem with the “gift as gift” approach and its variants, as 
argued by Caillé (1998), is their reductionism234, which cannot but reaffirm the primacy of 
rational action theory and utilitarian tradition in social sciences despite their failures in 
explaining the social foundations of modern societies (see Adloff and Mau, 2006). Derrida 
equates intention and calculation – whereas no guarantee of return does not necessarily 
mean no expectation  of return (Caillé, 1998) – denying human beings “the  capacity to 
entertain conflicting thoughts or interpretations without seeking to resolve them neatly” 
(Osteen,  2002:  16).  A  way  out  of  the  impasse  may  lie  in  coming  back  to  Mauss  to 
investigate  the  play  of  freedom  and  obligation  which  allows  the  gift  to  play  a role in 
creating social alliances (see Parry, 1986), as shown in the following with respect to the 
American Gift. 
A recurrent issue in Keynes’s diplomacy, as already seen on revisiting his criticisms 
to  the  business  character  of  US  assistance  during  WWI235,  the  giver’s  spontaneity  and 
voluntary offering is strongly reaffirmed in the negotiations of both Bretton Woods and 
the American Gift. As to the former, in his speech to the Lords of 23 May 1944 Keynes   37
stressed that the “shared responsibility” principle of the Joint Statement would not have 
been possible without  
 
“a voluntary undertaking, genuinely offered in the spirit both of a good neighbour 
and, I should add, of enlightened self-interest, not to allow a repetition of a chain of 
events which between the wars did more than any other single factor to destroy the 
world’s economic balance and to prepare a seed-bed for foul growths” 236.  
 
Coming  to  the  latter,  he  never  abandoned,  as  seen  above,  the  idea  of  making  the 
Americans  themselves  offer  a  gift  to  Britain,  as  the  result  of  a  sincere  appreciation  of 
Britain’s  effort  in  financing  the  war  and  future  expected  difficulties.  Keynes  was  well 
aware  of  the  risk  Britain  was  running:  in  one  of  the  first  memorandum  he  wrote  on 
external  finance237,  he  suggested  limiting  the  American  assistance  to  what  was  strictly 
required for maintaining Britain’s solvency and opposed any yielding to the American 
conception of the international economic system. He predicted that the US “would prefer 
us to end the war with exiguous gold and dollar reserves so that they will be in a position 
to force”238 on Britain a dollar loan “on our own credit  in order to allow sterling area 
countries [...] to buy United States exports out of their sterling balances”239. A contrast 
appears  neatly  between,  on  the  one  side,  the  widespread  interpretation  of  the  gift 
relationship  in  terms  of  the  giver’s  power  on  the  receiver,  whose  impossibility  to 
reciprocate, combined with the obligation to do so, compels him to enter a relation of 
dependence with the former240, and Keynes’s preference for a gift over a loan on the other. 
The economist is here opposing a the latter precisely because of its conditional character, 
whereas he favours the former, gift-solution, since that way only Britain would retain its 
“ultimate strength and independence”241. Otherwise, he added, Britain should refuse any 
agreement, to the disadvantage of both242.  
As seen above, on revisiting his proposals for the settlement of WWI Inter-Allied 
debts Keynes stressed that America did not have any “obligation” to do anything, though 
a moral reason, i.e. the US participation in the conflict as an investment policy, was surely 
reinforcing his case. Nor was he expecting the US to offer mitigation “unconditionally”243, 
even if a starting move by the Americans was required to save Europe from the burden of 
reparations  and  war  debts.  Keynes’s  proposals  were  criticized  exactly  for  both  their 
presumed “moral” character and the “unconditionality” of the American contribution they 
seemed  to  request.  Interestingly,  this  remarks  were  to  appear  again,  under  almost 
unchanged forms, twenty years later244. Still, was the coherence of Keynes’s request to the 
US really lying “in the realm of morals rather than finance”, and morality a “vehicle for 
illusion”  (Skidelsky,  2000:  384)?  History,  and  morals  with  it,  is  surely  at  the  basis  of 
Keynes’s plea for reconsidering the sharing of the costs of the war. But history is not the   38
crux of the problem analysed in Overseas Financial Policy in Stage III; though necessary to 
the  proposal,  Justice  “in  its  classic  Aristotelian  sense”  (ib.)  is  not  even  its  focal  point. 
Unless, due to the very history of previous relationships on which the American Gift, as 
any gift, is based – unlike market transactions, gifts cannot neglect, nor it is their intention 
to  eliminate,  the  initial  differences  between  the  parts  involved  (Godbout,  1998a)  –  the 
meaning of Justice can be extended to include those failures in accepting responsibility 
which characterized the US behaviour in the interwar period. Nor was justice, which may 
sound  even  more  surprising,  the  central  issue  of  Keynes’s  proposals  for  the  American 
contribution  to  the  rehabilitation  of  Europe  at  the  end  of  WWI,  but  economic 
interdependence,  with  the  dramatic  consequences  of  the  peace  deriving  from  the 
unnecessary burden of Inter-Allied debts and reparations to Europe and world economy, 
due  to  the  “unnatural  pattern  of  international  trading  relations”245  which  would  have 
followed.  The  same  goes  for  Overseas  Financial  Policy  in  Stage  III:  before  designing  its 
tripartite  scheme,  Keynes  had  been  repeatedly  pointing  out  that  “an  entirely  new 
approach on the part of the United States and ourselves”246 was needed, suggesting almost 
explicitely  that  the  coherence  of  the  memorandum  was  in  the  forward-,  rather  than 
backward-looking proposal for “a new departure”247.  
Should this coherence lie, on the contrary, mainly or exclusively in those “dubious 
moral”  factors  on  which  Keynes was  said  to  have based  his  criticisms  to  the business 
character of WWI American assistance, Skidelsky would be right to argue that Keynes 
made  mistakes.  In  Mini’s  (1994)  account,  Keynes  calculated  “the  amount  that  Britain 
needed to meet its obligations under Bretton Woods without undue apprehension, and 
then  dream  up  an  ‘equivalent  value’  to  give  to  the  United  States”  (ib.:  209), but  since 
“psychological matters affect judgement, making it highly subjective” (ib.), he made the error 
of arguing that Britain “had already ‘paid’ its debts; indeed, it was in credit toward the US 
and the rest of the world because of her sacrifices” (ib.: 209-210) during the war. But his 
argument rests “[o]n the premise that in relations between countries there is an exchange 
of equal for equal” (ib.: 209), which Keynes could not truly support248. Rather, Mini rightly 
argues that Keynes failed to emphasize, at the outset of the negotiations, that Justice was 
concerned with the future not less than with the past. A purely backward-looking Justice 
could not be a starter, as Keynes himself recognized, claiming that reference to justice did 
not rule out generosity on the part of the US, and that US self-interest – the argument 
opposed  to  Justice  in  this  scheme  –  should  be  emphasized  only  to  a  point,  and  not 
exclusively. In his speech to the Lords, while discussing the “principle of equal sacrifice, 
financial or otherwise”249 which the Americans had rejected, Keynes admitted that  
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“in  no  phase  of  human  experience  does  the  past  operate  so  directly  and 
arithmetically as we were trying to contend. Men’s sympathies and less calculated 
impulses are drawn from their memories of comradeship, but their contemporary 
acts  are  generally  directed  towards  influencing  the  future  and  not  towards 
pensioning the past”250.  
 
He was aware that the proposal of a “gigantic gift”251 intended to settle the past contrasted 
with the US likely valuing more Britain’s “future prospects of recovery and our intention 
to face the world boldly” than “past performance or our present weakness”252.  
The relational character of the gift being lost in negotiations, the correspondence 
between Brand and Keynes seem to configure a virtual representation of such a relation, 
with  the  latter  –  the  recipient  –  revealing  on  what  premises  his  proposal  stood  while 
practising  to  fight  the  argument  the  former  –  playing  the  giver’s  part  –  advanced  to 
suggest  the  impracticability  of  the  gift  option.  Surprisingly,  here  Keynes  insists  on 
unconditionality. He stressed with force that “anything in the nature of a bargain” should 
be  avoided  and  even  rejected  the  idea  of  rendering  explicit  the  terms  of  a  possible 
agreement with the US; the only non-specific concession to the American business moral 
was in accepting the “kind of post-war world” the Americans desired but would have 
failed to get if case of no gift. The “psychological atmosphere of the free gift” would have 
made it possible to induce the sterling area countries to assist Britain and persuade at the 
same time the US to offer financial relief without fear of deadweight loss; a result which 
would  have  been  extraordinarily  difficult  to  obtain  by  agreement.  In  words  similar  to 
those used by Alain Caillé to oppose the reductionistic views of Mauss’s The Gift, Keynes’s 
approach  was  based  less  on  ambiguity-resolving  devices  than  on  that  structural 
uncertainty  which,  only,  can  lead  actors  previously  regarding  each  other  as  rivals  to 
gamble on mutual trust. Since every gift is, in a way, agonistic – “the obligation of rivalry 
through displayed generosity”, says Caillé (2005: 8) – the giver forcedly exposes herself to 
uncertainty and the risk of no return, as the precondition for establishing a social bonding 
mechanism  benefiting  all  the  parts  involved.  Unconditionality  is  here  conceived  in 
opposition to the meaning assigned to the term in modern thinking, imbued with  
 
the certainty that nothing can be obtained in social existence without condition, 
that everything proceeds from immediate exchanges, that nothing can be obtained 
with nothing, or, more precisely, that one cannot get anything without anything of 
exact equivalence, and that therefore there must always be equality of credits and 
debts,  rights  and  duties.  Even  the  certainty  that  this  imperative  of  generalized 
conditionality  and  equivalence  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  empirical  social  actions 
(Caillé, 1998: 115-116)253.  
 
For Mauss (1990), on the contrary,  
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“there is no middle way: one trusts completely or mistrusts completely: one lays 
down one’s arms and gives up magic, or one gives everything, from fleeting acts of 
hospitality to one’s daughter and one’s good (ib.: 81).  
 
But this unconditionality, Caillé observes, is not unconditional, for it is conditional to the 
appearance of positive interactions254 and necessarily lives under the threat of falling back 
to the unconditional diffidence of the clash of interests; only after unconditionality has 
given life to the alliance partners may pose conditions and exercise an “exit” option. 
In  a  recent  essay,  Marcuzzo  (2008)  interestingly  claims  that  the  correspondence 
between  Brand  reveals  Keynes’s  persuasion  strategy,  whose  two  pillars  would  be 
“selecting the arguments which would appeal to the self-interest of the party which he 
was addressing at the time” (ib.: 13), and “searching for framework in which each side’s 
interests could be made to coincide as parts of the same general interest” (ib.). Rather than 
being the “rhetorical device” (ib.) substituting for the common framework (if seen as the 
form of reconsidering the war burden) or the practical means of avoiding a loan-induced 
world  deflationary  pressure,  however,  the  American  Gift  is  the  possibility  itself  to 
structure  the  framework,  the  element  “chang[ing]  the  environment  within  which 
individuals operate, so that moral and rational motives become the spring of action of the 
collectivity as a whole”, inducing “behaviour to conform to goals which were attainable 
only bypassing individualistic motivation or utilitarian calculations” (ib.: 16)255. A “first” 
gift  with  no  strings  attached  other  than  those  of  the  history  of  previous  relations, 
displaying the giver’s “conditional unconditionality”, the American Gift as imagined by 
Keynes was to push its spirit along the chain of participants in a multilateral solution to 
global imbalances to the benefit of the Americans too, through the spiral movement he 
described in Overseas Financial Policy in Stage III. Not a charitable gift, Keynes’s American 
Gift is a complex mix of self-interest and disinterest, obligation and freedom, rivalry and 
alliance.  The  positive  poles  of  these  dichotomies  appears  with  clearness  once  the 
expectations about the future its gamble embodies are considered in full. That measure of 
social indebtedness which Keynes desired every partner involved to positively appreciate 
as a precondition for working together on a new world order, the fact itself of acceding to 
a state of mutual trust improving objectively and subjectively the condition of everyone256, 
was based on clearing up not the past, but its dramatic consequences on the future, in the 
form of market indebtedness.  
 
What Mauss shows, through his enquiry on archaic gift, is that social action is not 
shaped only by the individual and rational self-interest stressed by rational-actor 
theory but also by a primary logic of sympathy [...], and that this tension between 
self-interest and sympathy is crossed by another tension between obligation and 
freedom. The obligation to give is a paradoxical obligation to be free and to oblige 
others to be free too. Gift, so, is an hybridation between self-interest and other-  41
interest,  and  between  obligation  and  liberty  (or  creativity).  And  not  only  is  it 
empirically  so.  It  also  has  to  be  so.  If  self-interest  were  not  mixed  with  interest 
toward  others  (and  reciprocally)  gift  would  become  either  a  buying  act  or  a 
sacrifice.  And  if  obligation  were  not  mixed  with  freedom  (and  reciprocally)  it 
would become a purely formal and empty ritual or collapse into non sense (ib.: 6).  
 
Keynes’s American Gift is inhabited by the strange mix of freedom and obligation which is 
typical  of  the  gift.  Though  sincerely  committed  to  the  creation  of  a  one  world257,  the 
Americans  never  came  to  regard  their  largesse  outside  the  realm  of  instrumental 
rationality; but “[l]e gift est condamné dans la mesure où il sert une rationalité mercantile” 
(Perroux, 1963 : 174), disinterest and freeness become synonyms for exploitation. “Parce 
qu’il devrait protéger et développer des vies des hommes, on pourrait lui appliquer ce que 
Lord Keynes avançait dans son discours du 18 décembre 1945 au nom des sacrifices subis 
par la Grande-Bretagne au cours de la guerre”, says Perroux (ib.). Still, the American Gift 
was  not  a  simple  counter  gift  to  the  “capital  du  courage  libérateur”,  but  the  first, 
constitutive element of a new dynamics, requiring Britain to reciprocate. This obligation is 
however the most uneasily manageable issue to address of the American Gift: as Keynes 
had  repeatedly  been  arguing,  only  a  gift  could  allow  Britain  to  face  its  obligation  to 
reciprocate, that is to take part in the kind of post-war world everyone wished to live in. 
Overseas Financial Policy in Stage III contains the key passage for this apparent paradox: the 
Americans were given the historical chance, Keynes wrote, to  
 
make us an offer, not so much generous as just, using their financial strength not as 
an instrument to force us to their will, but as a means of making it possible for us to 
participate in arrangements which we ourselves prefer on their merits if only they 
can be made practicable for us258.  
 
It seems odd that the obligation to reciprocate should depend on the practical possibility 
to do so. Yet Mauss himself plays that very game of obligation and freedom which he 
refers to when introducing, without defining, the gift (see Godbout, 1998a). He begins his 
work by observing that “exchanges and contracts take place in the form of presents; in 
theory they are voluntary, in reality they are given and reciprocated obligatorily” (Mauss, 
1990: 3). The fact itself that there is a return suggests that obligation is the true character of 
the  gift.  In  the  course  of  the  Essai,  however,  Mauss  focuses  more  and  more  on  the 
atmosphere  of  the  gift,  as  if  he  had  to  keep  his  distance  from  a  Derrideian  view  of 
reciprocating as the mercantile nature of gift giving259, and ends up with asserting the 
freedom  to  reciprocate:  the  “atmosphere  of  the  gift”  is  described  as  that  in  which 
“obligation and liberty intermingle” (ib.: 65). The Essai’s last words are: “let us adopt as 
the principle of our life what has always been a principle of action and will always be so: 
to emerge from self, to give, freely and obligatorily. We run no risk of disappointment”   42
(ib.: 71). How Mauss’s playing with the game of freedom and obligation may translate into 
the dynamics of concrete gifts? The conditional unconditionality on which the effort to 
create alliances is based presupposes a certain degree of playing with the rules; in gift-
giving,  rules  and  givers  rely  on  implicitness260  “in  order  to  preserve  or  introduce  an 
element of risk into the appearance of the counter-gift, an uncertainty, an indeterminacy 
[...] to insinuate ‘properties of undecidability’ into the sequence” (Godbout, 1998a: 187). As 
an attempt to extend the borders of community, the gift  is “a probe into uncertainty” 
(Gudeman, 2001: 467). Confidence, and the uncertainty which goes along with this, is “a 
precondition for any social bond, which explains why all determinist theories run around 
on this elementary but primordial phenomenon, basic to freedom” (Godbout, 1998a: 190): 
“[e]very gift is an act that widens the scope of freedom for the members of a society” (ib.). 
If every partner involved in a gift exchange gives in his turn rather than reciprocating in a 
quasi-mechanical manner, it is exactly because the gift compels to think obligation and 
freedom as interrelated, and even tends – paradoxically, if seen with modern eyes – to free 
the receiver from the duty of reciprocity, allowing him to freely choose to reciprocate; 
obliging him to freely reciprocate.  
This  is  the  result  of  the  analysis  here  proposed  of  Keynes’s  American  Gift:  the 
difference  between  a  loan,  though  a  generous  one,  and  a  gift  lies  in  the  opposite 
repercussions they would have on the receiver’s freedom to choose. In the former case, 
Britain would be compelled to accept the American conception of the international economic 
system  by  means  of  austerity  policies  and  would  run  the  risk  of  “being  had”  by  the 
Americans using their assistance as an instrument to force Britain to their will and causing 
it to give up taking its responsibility for the new order. A gift, on the contrary, “as a means 
of making it possible for us to participate in arrangements which we ourselves prefer on 
their merits if only they can be made practicable for us”, would allow Britain the freedom to 
choose to “march side by side” with the US in the construction of the desired post-war 
world.  Here  is  the  fundamental  difference  between  the  duty  of  reciprocity  and  the 
paradoxical obligation to be free which Mauss posed at the basis of the gift. Freedom lies 
both at the beginning and at the end of the American Gift, so as to remark the opening of 
new social and historical possibilities (Caillé, 2001). The act of receiving consists in the 
opening of a double “espace du jeu”, thanks to, on the one side, the dismissal of utilitarian 
calculation  and  the  intention  to  exploit  and  accumulate,  and  to  uncertainty  and 
unpredictability, on the other, which appear “comme la salvaguarde de la liberté mutuelle 
et  réciproque  du  donateur  et  du  receveur  dans  le  cadre  des  relations  complexes  de 
l’échange” (Fixot, 1992: 237). Only a gift could allow Britain the possibility to actively choose   43
and help to shape the multilateral option, rather than being compelled to passively accept its “à 
l’Américaine” version.  
Freedom is first of all freedom from economic necessity261. Echoes of the Economic 
Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, the essay where Keynes’s anti-utilitarian philosophy is 
applied to describe a not far off age of abundance, caused by the development of resources 
and techniques, when “the economic problem will take the back seat where it belongs”262, 
are evident in some key passages of Keynes’s diplomacy during WWII.  
 
“[T]he profound conviction that the economic problem, as one may call it for short, 
the problem of want and poverty and the economic struggle between classes and 
nations,  is  nothing  but  a  frightful  muddle,  a  transitory  and  an  unnecessary 
muddle”263.  
 
inspires his analysis of the Joint Statement for Bretton Woods – “[h]ere is a field where 
mere  sound  thinking  may  do  something  useful  to  ease  the  material  burdens  of  the 
children of men”264 and places itself, as seen, among the reasons he argued to call for the 
American Gift265. However, the freedom coming at the end of the American Gift is also, 
and  more  precisely,  freedom  to  choose.  The  unconditionality  of  American  behaviour 
asked for by Keynes strongly contrasts with the US desire to complete the path they began 
with  the  negotiations  of  the  Lend-Lease  agreement  and  come  to  specify  definitely  the 
contents of “consideration”. The American Gift episode is the climax of the clash between 
discipline and freedom characterizing the whole history of war-time relationships between 
the two Anglo-Saxon powers. Keynes’s plans for Bretton Woods and his proposal for an 
American Gift were but the final, most explicit configurations of his lifelong attempt to 
solve the dilemma of the international system; to conjugate, in other words, these two 
dimensions for the construction of a new order where discipline, eliminating the economic 
anxieties at the international level, is exercised not against, but in favour of national policy 
space and freedom. In his vision, the limitation of policy space which is required by global 
interdependency must be compensated by countries’ participation to a multilateral system 
reducing the frictions between national freedom and international discipline by managing 
the co-habitation of “different brands of national capitalism” (Rodrik, 1998: 2) instead of 
imposing  on  them  a  one-size-fits-all  set  of  right  policies.  Quite  the  contrary  of  the 
unrestricted  laissez-faire  of  the  gold  standard  and  currency  and  trade  policies  in  the 
interwar period, which in Keynes’s words “mistake private licence for public liberty”266.  
Keynes considered Bretton Woods and the American Loan, as he revealed when 
trying to persuade the Lords to vote for the latter, as the  
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“first great attempt at organizing international order out of the chaos of the war in 
a way which will not interfere with the diversity of national policy yet which will 
minimize the causes of friction and ill will between nations”267.  
 
The plans, which “do not wander from the international terrain and [...] are consistent 
with  widely  different  conceptions  of  domestic  policy”,  were  “a  great  step  forward” 
towards an “international economic order amidst national diversities of policies”; but that 
was  to  remain  more  the  ideal  outcome  of  Keynes’s  desired  reform  schemes  than  the 
practical  result  of  the  “newly-trod  path”,  not  yet  “pioneered  [...]  to  a  definite  final 
destination”268. The optimistic hopes for a rapid recovery of international equilibrium he 
expressed in his speech to the Political Economy Club (see Lloyd, 2006) as well as in his 
last  article,  The  Balance  of  Payments  of  the  United  States,  are  less  striking  than  it  would 
appear from criticisms Keynes received for praising the virtue of the long-run “classical 
medicine” (ib.: 4) as a supplement to the short-run provisions of Bretton Woods and the 
American  Loan.  Generally  speaking,  it  seems  reasonable  to  argue  that  the  degree  of 
freedom  of  trade  Keynes  envisaged  for  the  future  world  depended  on  the  extent  of 
cooperation existing at the international level. Markwell (2006) claims that  
 
In 1945 and 1946 Keynes did little more than reiterate his General Theory position; 
but now international cooperation to relieve the balance of payments constraint, 
and  to  stabilize  capital  flows,  and  national  commitments  to  full  (or  high) 
employment, had created the preconditions for ‘the classical theory [to come] into 
its own again’. Likewise, Keynes’s 1933 isolationist arguments were met: domestic 
policy autonomy seemed  guaranteed  by  an international system  which was,  he 
hoped, itself expansionist; and international conflict was minimized by ensuring 
joint gains from economic interactions (ib.: 207).  
 
Vines (2003) adds that Keynes’s last article includes a sketch of the kind of adjustment, 
based on changes in relative prices, he desired for the multilateral free-trade system of the 
future. However, even the American discovery of “ways of life which, compared with the 
ways of the less fortunate regions of the world, must tend towards, and not away from, 
external equilibrium”  269 is destined to seem more, in Keynes’s own words, a temporary 
solution “the post-war world must not be content with”270, than the complement to a new 
architecture designed to reduce the international economic problem. After the battle for 
the American Gift, both Keynes and the US resorted to pragmatism; the latter rethinking 
the logic underlying its reply to Keynes’s requests when faced by the 1947 sterling crisis 
and the sad perspective of a collapsed Europe. The Marshall Plan finally announced “the 
transformation of the USA into the kind of big spending creditor envisaged in the Clearing 
Union plan” (Newton, 2006: 4). A question of “enlightened self-interest”, Gardner (1975: 
211) argues: “if it failed to do so the rest of the world would go broke” (ib.). Though there   45
is  no  direct  reference  to  Keynes  in  the  process  which  led  to  the  European  Recovery 
Programme, “[i]t is clear that Marshall and some, at least, of those who advised him had 
the experience following the First World War much in mind” (Markwell, 2007: 267). Here 
came, thirty years later his 1919 proposals, Keynes’s “revenge”. Significantly, however, 
Perroux’s (1992) words celebrating the US, finally more than “l'honnête banquier ou [le] 
parfait négociant” (ib.: 56), for giving up playing the role of a creditor who wants to be 
repaid  and  export  despite  its  unwillingness  to  face  international  competition,  seem  to 
describe  better  the  aim  of  Keynes’s  proposal  than  the  practical  implications  of  the 




With the help of the anthropological and sociological literature on gift-giving, we have 
tried to show that Keynes’s diplomacy in the American Loan episode lies in continuity 
with  his  overall  project  to  solve  the  dilemmas  of  the  system. To  follow  Vines’s (2003) 
advice to deepen the understanding of Keynes’s contributions on “focus and method” (ib.: 
358) and explore his vision of “how pieces of the global economy interact, driven by the 
policies of autonomous nations,  in an only partly coherent manner” (ib.: 339), a move 
beyond was required, without neglecting it, the strategic dimension which traditionally 
locks in Keynes’s American Gift proposal, to enter the intrinsically more uncertain realm 
of social international links as a means to assure the system the needed degree of stability 
and  the  “shared  responsibilities”  rules  needed  to  orderly  manage  its  imbalances.  Our 
conclusion  is  that  Keynes  was  seeking  for  mechanisms  devised  to  enhance  national 
autonomy  through  countries’  participation  in  a  multilateral  system.  The  rediscovery  of 
Keynes which seems to lie at the end of the Washington Consensus saga (see Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 2006; Polanyi Levitt, 2006; Davidson, 2007) comes therefore as no surprise (see 
Cedrini, forthcoming). With its emphasis on discipline as well as on the universality of 
“right” paths to economic growth, the Washington Consensus271 as the paradigm of the 
integrationist agenda of the Nineties has heavily contributed to the shrinking in policy 
space available to developing countries, denying them even the right to be wrong (Chang, 
2006). The contrast with the pre-war gold standard with its “socially-constructed monetary 
agreement that included a simple set of rules around which core lenders and borrowers 
could build expectations of a stable future” (Unctad, 2004: 92) is evident, as well as with 
the now widely appreciated “embedded liberalism” of Bretton Woods, allowing countries 
to  follow  a  broad  economic  agenda  while  supporting  growth  and  stability  through 
international  action.  The  success  of  Bretton  Woods  was  however  based  both  on  its   46
systemic features and on some happy accidents which could, as it happened, fail to persist. 
The  system  was  unable  to  perpetuate,  in  particular,  the  leader’s  commitment,  and 
possibility,  to  act  responsibly  (Davidson,  1992-93)  for  a  “sounder  political  economy 
between  all  nations”.  But  the  Washington  Consensus  as  the  rule  of  the  “nonsystem” 
(Williamson, 1983) post-Bretton Woods and its emphasis on discipline, prompting for that 
“global conformity to the economic orthodoxy [that] Keynes had rejected” (Newton, 2006: 
5) are the real symbols of Keynes’s defeat: if the failure of the paradigm calls for a revival 
of  the  economist’s  intuitions  for  the  international  order,  this  is  likely  due  to  what  we 
believe  to  be  the  core  message  of  his  activity  as  an  international  negotiator:  a  new 
successful  international  system  of  national  capitalisms  will  be  more  likely  based  on 
consensus upon freedom rather than discipline, on the will to enhance freedom to choose 
and promote the diversity of national policies rather than on a disciplined harmonization 
of different ways to prosperity.  
We  believe  that  a  “Fighting  through  Britain”  approach  may  strengthen  today’s 
confidence in Keynes’s international macroeconomics. Once the story of his achievements 
is seen as the continuous refinement of the search for a solution to the dilemma of the 
international  system  between  discipline  and  freedom,  the  American  Gift  no  longer 
appears strictly as an unworkable escape clause for Britain’s leadership, nor a ill-conceived 
strategic asset Keynes was somewhat bound to use due to the lack of viable alternatives 
and bargaining power vis-à-vis the US. Rather, the proposal appears to embody the most 
profound  sense  of  Keynes’s  search  for  a  new  order  where  adherence  to  international 
discipline  is  itself  a  freedom-enhancing  mechanism.  The  complex  mix  of  freedom  and 
obligation which characterizes the American Gift and which is held by the anthropological 
and sociological literature to be a constitutive element of gift-giving, allows to abstract 
theoretically, at least in part, from the special relationship between the two Anglo-Saxon 
powers traditionally invoked to explain Keynes’s role in the episode. Keynes was fighting 
through Britain – the enlargement of the spectrum of the participant in the correction of 
global imbalances to the US and the Sterling Area countries is more than a relevant hint 
for  that  –,  with  multilateralism  as  both  the  solution,  in  line  with  the  ICU  “shared 
responsibilities” spirit, and the result, in terms of freer world trade, of the international 
economic  problem.  And  he  was  fighting  through  Britain  in  his  search  for  symmetrical 
international adjustment, every reform plan devised by Keynes deriving from a previous 
British concern, as the Treatise makes clear. The ICU was paradoxically both a substantial 
improvement and a complete reversal, though in continuity of spirit, of a gold standard 
whose unqualified revival after 1914 caused its improper working, and even dampened 
the  economic  destiny  of  countries  submitted  to  its  discipline.  But  the  pre-war  gold   47
standard was for him a model of symmetric adjustment, with an international leadership 
committed to act in harmony with the general interest of the system as a whole. After the 
rejection of the ICU plan, Keynes turned to the US, as he had been repeatedly doing in the 
years between the two wars, asking them to accept the responsibilities which go along 
with the rise of their financial power. Hence, with Britain’s indebtedness as the contingent 
reason for it, his American Gift proposal, as a prolongation, under different forms, of the 
ICU plan.  
Finally272,  the  approach  here  outlined  provides  means  to  rethink  Keynes’s  final 
disappointment with the new system his name is linked to, in line with Newton’s (2006) 
criticisms of Harrod’s somewhat persisting “misleading” narrative (ib.: 1). Our aim was to 
add  an  argument  to  explore  such  disillusionment  without  unduly  exaggerating  the 
relevance  of  Keynes’s  “National  Self-Sufficiency”  thesis  or  referring  to  the  somewhat 
abused  story  of  the  paper  Keynes  is  said  to  have  written  and  destroyed  after  the 
conference  of  Savannah,  condemning  the  American  attitude  towards  international 
cooperation273. The extent of Keynes’s disappointment is then measured by the distance 
between, on the one side, the intellectual consensus of Bretton Woods, emerging from “a 
transatlantic group of economists and policy specialists, united by a common set of policy 
ideas  and  a  shared  view  that  past  economic  failures  could  be  avoided  by  innovative 
postwar  economic  arrangements,  [who]  led  their  respective  governments  toward 
agreement by identifying a set of common Anglo-American interests that were not clearly 
seen by others” (Ikenberry, 1993: 59)274 and, on the other side, the consensus Keynes wished 
to create for the post-war world. Still lacking a valuable alternative to the integrationist 
agenda, we cannot weasel out of the commitment to revisit Keynes’s ideas, if our aim is to 
devise an international formula for todays world allowing “different brands of national 
capitalisms” to prosper side by side (Rodrik, 1998: 2). According to Ikenberry (1993: 82), 
the negotiations for Bretton Woods profited from a “lost moment of history”:  
 
“[n]ot all increments of historical time are equal. There are junctures or “break 
points” at which possibilities for major change are particularly great and the scope 
of  possible  outcomes  is  unusually  wide.  These  are  moments  of  historical 
possibility” (ib.). 
 
Historical  moments,  to  borrow  Prigogine’s  words,  at  which  events  may  appear 
engendering new coherences. The American Gift was a likely candidate to be an event of 
that kind.  
 
 
   48
REFERENCES 
 
Adloff, F. and Mau, S. “Giving Social Ties, Reciprocity in Modern Society.” Archives Européennes de 
sociologie, 2006, 47 (1), 93-123. 
 
Agnati, A., Covi, A. and Ferrari Bravo, G. I due Keynes. Padova: CLEUP, 1983. 
 
Anspach, M.R. À charge de revanche. Figures élémentaires de la réciprocité, Paris: Seuil, 2002. 
 
Berking, H. Sociology of Giving. London: SAGE, 1999. 
 
Boughton, J.M. “Why White, Not Keynes? Inventing the Postwar International Monetary System.” 
International Monetary Fund Working paper WP/02/52, March 2002. 
 
Caillé, A. Il terzo paradigma. Antropologia filosofica del dono. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1998. 
 
Caillé, A. “The Double Inconceivability of the Free Gift”, Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities, 
August 2001, 6 (1), 23-29. 
 
Caillé, A. “Anti-utilitarianism, economics and the gift-paradigm”, available at: 
www.revuedumauss.com.fr/media/ACstake.pdf, 2005. 
 
Cairncross, A. “Keynes and the Planned Economy.” In A. THIRLWALL (ed.), Keynes and Laissez-
Faire. London: Macmillan, 1978, 36-58. 
 
Callari, A. “The ghost of the gift: the unlikelihood of economics.” In Osteen, M. The Question of the 
Gift. Essays Across Disciplines. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, 248-265. 
 
Carabelli, A.M. On Keynes’s Method. London: Macmillan, 1988. 
 
Carabelli, A.M. “Keynes on Probability, Uncertainty and Tragic Choices.” Cahiers d’économie 
politique, 1998 30-31, 187-226. 
 
Carabelli, A. and De Vecchi, N. “‘Where to draw the line’? Keynes versus Hayek on knowledge, 
ethics and economics.” The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Summer 1999, 6 
(2), 271-296. 
 
Carabelli, A. and De Vecchi, N. “Individuals, Public Institutions and Knowledge: Hayek and 
Keynes.” In Porta, P., Scazzieri, R. and Skinner, A. (eds.) Knowledge, Social Institutions and the 
Division of Labour. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 2000, 229-48. 
 
Carr, W. “John Maynard Keynes and the Treaty of Versailles.” In Thirlwall, A.P. (ed.) Keynes As a 
Policy Adviser. London: Macmillan, 1982, 77-108. 
 
Carrier, J.G. Gifts and Commodities: Exchange and Western Capitalism since 1700. New York: Routledge, 
1995. 
   49
Cedrini, M. Keynes’s Gift for the International Economic System, Unpublished PhD dissertation, 
University of Turin, 2007. 
 
Cedrini, M. “Consensus Vs. Freedom or Consensus Upon Freedom ? From Washington Disorder to 
the Rediscovery of Keynes.” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Cesarano, F. “Keynes’s Revindication of Classical Monetary Theory.” History of Political Economy, 
2003, 35 (3), 491-519. 
 
Cesarano, F. Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods. The Construction of an International Monetary Order. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Chang, H.-J. “Policy Space in Historical Perspective – with special reference to Trade and 
Industrial Policies.” Economic and Political Weekly, February 18-24, 2006, 41 (7), 627-33. 
 
Clarke, R. Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace 1942-1949, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1982. 
 
CW = E. Johnson and D.E. Moggridge (eds.), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. I-
XXX, London: Macmillan, 1971-89. 
 
Daunton, M.J. “Britain and globalisation since 1850: Creating a global order, 1850-1914.” 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 2006, 16, 1-38. 
 
Davidson, P. “Reforming the World’s Money.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Winter 1992-3, 
15 (2), 153-179. 
 
Davidson, P. John Maynard Keynes. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
 
De Cecco, M. “The Last of the Romans.” In R. Skidelsky (ed.), The End of the Keynesian Era. Essays on 
the disintegration of the Keynesian political economy. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977, 18-24. 
 
De Cecco, M. Moneta e impero. Il sistema finanziario internazionale dal 1890 al 1914, Torino: Einaudi, 
1979a. 
 
De Cecco, M. “Origins of the post-war payments system.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1979b, 3, 
49-61. 
 
De Cecco, M. “John Maynard Keynes.” Rivista di storia economica, dicembre 2001, 17 (3), 373-82. 
 
DeLong, J. B. “Review of Skidelsky’s ‘John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain’.” Journal of 
Economic Literature, March 2002, 40 (1), 155-162. 
 
Derrida, J. Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
 
Dillon, W.S. Gifts & Nations, New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK): Transaction Publishers, 
2004.  
   50
Dimand, R.W. “A prodigy of constructive work”: J.M. Keynes on Indian Currency and Finance.” In 
W.J. Barber (ed.), Perspectives on the History of Economic Thought Volume VI. Themes in Keynesian 
Criticism and Supplementary Modern Topics. Selected Papers from the History of Economics 
Conference 1989, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991, 29-35. 
 
Dimand, R.W. “Keynes on Global Economic Integration”, Atlantic Economic Journal, 2006, 34, 175-
82. 
 
Douglas, M. Foreword. In M. Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, vii-xviii. 
 
Eichengreen, B. Globalizing Capital. A History of the International Monetary System, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998. 
 
Ferrari Bravo, G. Keynes. Uno studio di diplomazia economica. Padova: Cedam, 1990. 
 
Ferrari Bravo, G. “Rincorrendo Proteo. Alcune note in margine all’azione di J.M. Keynes dalla 
prima alla seconda guerra mondiale.” Working Paper n. 15, Dipartimento di Studi 
Internazionali dell’Università di Padova, 2002 (available at: www.dsiunipd.it/wp15-02.pdf). 
 
Fixot, A.-M. “Donner c’est bien, recevoir c’est mieux.” La revue du MAUSS, 1er et 2e trimestre 1992, 
15-16, 236-238. 
 
Fleming, G. “Foreign investment, reparations and the proposal for an international bank: notes on 
the lectures of J. M. Keynes in Geneva, July 1929.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2000, 24, 
139-151. 
 
Gardner, R.N. “Bretton Woods.” In M. Keynes (ed.), Essays on John Maynard Keynes, London-New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 202-215. 
 
Gardner, R.N. Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956. 
 
Gasché, R. “Heliocentric exchange.” In A. Schrift (ed.), The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of 
Generosity. New York: Routledge, 2002, 100-117. 
 
Godbout, J.T. (in collaboration with A. Caillé) The World of the Gift, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1998a. 
 
Godbout, J.T. “The moral of the gift.” The Journal of Socioeconomics, 1998b, 27, 557-570. 
 
Gouldner, A. “The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement.” In A. Komter (ed.), The gift: an 
interdisciplinary perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996, 49-66. 
 
Gouldner, A. “The Importance of Something for Nothing.” In Id., For Sociology. Renewal and 
Critique in Sociology Today. London: Allen Lane, 1973, 260-99. 
 
Greenwald, B. and Stiglitz, J.E. “A Modest Proposal for International Monetary Reform.” Paper 
prepared for the annual American Economics Association, Boston, MA, January 2006   51
(available at http://web.gc.cuny.edu/economics/SeminarPapers/Fall,2006/international_ 
monetary_reform-joe%20stglitz.pdf). 
 
Gudeman, S., “Postmodern gifts.” In S. Cullenberg, J. Amariglio and D.F. Ruccio (eds.), 
Postmodernism, Economics and Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 459-74. 
 
Harrod, R. F. The Life of John Maynard Keynes. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951. 
 
Harrod, R. F. Towards a Dynamic Economics. London: Macmillan, 1948. 
 
Hirschman, A.O. “How the Keynesian Revolution Was Exported from the United States, and Other 
Comments.” In P.A. Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, 347-360. 
 
Hutchison, T.W. “The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Volumes I-VI and XV-XVI.” In 
J. Cunningham Wood (ed.), John Maynard Keynes Critical Assessments, London: Routledge, 
1983, 428-41. 
 
Hyde, L. The Gift. Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property. London: Vintage Books, 1983. 
 
Ikenberry, G.J. “Creating Yesterday’s New World Order: Keynesian ‘New Thinking’ and the 
Anglo-American Postwar Settlement.” In J. Goldstein and R. O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign 
Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1993, 57-86. 
 
Insel, A. “L'enchâssement problématique du don dans la théorie néoclassique.” La revue du 
MAUSS, 2e trimestre 1991, 12, 110-19. 
 
Johnson, E.S. and Johnson, H. G. The Shadow of Keynes. Understanding Keynes, Cambridge and 
Keynesian Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978. 
 
Lord Kahn, R. “Historical Origins of the International Monetary Fund.” In A. Thirlwall (ed.), Keynes 
and International Monetary Relations. London: Macmillan, 1976, 2-35. 
 
Kirshner, J. “Keynes, capital mobility anf the crisis of embedded liberalism.” Review of International 
Political Economy, Autumn 1999, 6 (3), 313-337. 
 
Komter, A. (ed.) The gift: an interdisciplinary perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
1996.  
 
Lévi-Strauss, C. “Introduction à l'œuvre de Marcel Mauss.” In M. Mauss, Sociologie et Anthropologie, 
Paris: PUF, 1980 (1950), IX-LII. 
 
Sir Lloyd, J. “Summary of an Address by Lord Keynes to the Political Economy Club, Trinity 
College, Cambridge on the 2nd February 1946.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, January 2006, 
30 (1), 2-6. 
   52
Malinowski, B. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the 
Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1922. 
 
Malinowski, B. “The Principle of Give and Take.” In A. Komter (ed.), The gift: an interdisciplinary 
perspective, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996 (1926), 15-17. 
 
Marchionatti, R. “Dealing with Complexity. Marshall and Keynes and the Nature of Economic 
Thinking” in R. Aréna and M. Quéré (eds.), The Economics of Alfred Marshall, London: 
Palgrave, 2002, 32-52. 
 
Marcuzzo, M.C. “Keynes and persuasion.” In M. Forstater and L. R. Wray (eds), Keynes for the 21st 
Century: The Continuing Relevance of The General Theory. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008 
(forthcoming; available at: 
http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/HES%202007/papers/1b%20marcuzzo.doc) 
 
Markwell, D.J. John Maynard Keynes and International Relations. Economic Paths to War and Peace. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 
 
Markwell, D.J. “J. M. Keynes, Idealism, and the Economic Bases of Peace.” In D. Long and P. 
Wilson, Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis. Inter-war Idealism Reassessed. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995, 189-213. 
 
Mauss, M. The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1990 (1923-24). 
 
Meltzer, A.H., Keynes's Monetary Theory: A Different Interpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989. 
 
Mini, P.V. John Maynard Keynes. A Study in the Psychology of Original Work. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1994. 
 
Mini, P.V. “Keynes, Schacht And The ‘New Order’”, EABR & ETLC Conference, Firenze, June 2006 
(available at: http://www.cluteinstitute.org/Programs/FLORENCE-ITALY-JUNE-
2006/Article% 20194.pdf).  
 
Moggridge, D.E. “Keynes and the International Monetary System 1909-46.”, In J. S. Cohen and G. C. 
Harcourt (eds.), International Monetary Problems and Supply-Side Economics: Essays in Honour of 
Lorie Tarshis, London: Macmillan, 1986, 56-83. 
 
Moggridge, D.E. Maynard Keynes. An economist’s biography, London-New York: Routledge, 1992. 
 
Moggridge, D.E. “Skidelsky on Keynes: A Review Essay.” History of Political Economy, 2002, 34 (3), 
633-655. 
 
Newton, S. “J. M. Keynes and the Postwar International Economic Order.” History Compass, March 
2006, 4 (2), 308-313. 
   53
Newton, S. “A ‘Visionary Hope’ Frustrated: J. M. Keynes and the Origins of the Postwar 
International Monetary Order.” Diplomacy and Statecraft, March 2000, 11 (1), 189-210. 
 
Osteen, M. The Question of the Gift. Essays Across Disciplines. London and New York: Routledge, 
2002. 
 
Perroux, F. “The Gift: Its Economic Meaning in Contemporary Capitalism.” Diogène, Summer 1954, 
6, 1-21. 
 
Perroux, F. Économie et société. Contrainte-Échange-Don, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963. 
 
Perroux, F. “Le Plan Marshall ou l'Europe nécessaire au monde.” In Id., Œuvres complètes. I. 
L’Europe dans le monde. Textes complémentaires sur la coexistence pacifique, Grenoble : Presses 
Universitaires de Grenoble, 1992, 125-221. 
 
Polanyi, K., The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1944. 
 
Polanyi Levitt, K. “Keynes and Polanyi: the 1920s and the 1990s.” Review of International Political 
Economy, February 2006, 13 (1), 152-177. 
 
Pressnell, L.S. External Economic Policy Since the War. Volume I. The Post-War Financial Settlement. 
London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1986. 
 
Pressnell, L.S. “Keynes and Wartime Finance: A Clarification.” History of Political Economy, 2003, 35 
(4), 679-684. 
 
Ramel, F. “Mauss et l’étude des relations internationales: un héritage oublié.” Sociologie et Sociétés, 
Automne 2004, 36 (2), 227-245. 
 
Rodrik, D. “Rethinking the World Economy”, October 1998, available at: 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/~drodrik/TNRpiece.html.  
 
Rodrik, D. “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Winter 2000, 14 (1), 177-186. 
 
Ruggie, J.G. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization, Spring 1982, 36 (2), 379-415. 
 
Sahlins, M. Stone Age Economics. Chicago and New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972. 
 
Simmel, G. “Faithfulness and Gratitude.” In A. Komter (ed.), The gift: an interdisciplinary perspective, 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996 (1908), 39-48. 
 
Skidelsky, R. John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain 1937-1946, London: Macmillan, 2000. 
 
Skidelsky, R. John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Freedom 1937-1946, New York: Viking, 2001. 
   54
UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report. Policy Coherence, Development Strategies and Integration into 
the World Economy. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2004.  
 
Vicarelli, F. Keynes. L’instabilità del capitalismo. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989. 
 
Vines, D. “John Maynard Keynes 1937-1946: The Creation of International Macroeconomics.” The 
Economic Journal, June 2003, 113 (488), 338-361.  
 
Williamson, J. “Review of The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. Volume XXV. Activities 
1940-1944. Shaping the Post-War World. The Clearing Union.; The Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes. Volume XXVI. Activities 1941-1946. Shaping the Post-War World. Bretton Woods 
and Reparations.” The Economic Journal, June 1981, 91 (362), 541-544. 
 
Williamson, J. “Keynes and the international economic order.” In D. Worswick and J. Trevithick 
(eds.), Keynes and the modern world. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 87-
113. 
 
Zenou, Y., Batifoulier, P. and Cordonnier, L. “L’emprunt de la théorie économique à la tradition 




                                                 
1 Where the noble cause is freedom, “the supreme value for which both Britain and the United States fought” (Skidelsky, 
2001: xiii).  
2 Following Skidelsky, Boughton (2001) describes Keynes as “Defender of the Empire” (ib: 12). Of course, that was the 
task his Government desired him to accomplish, while his personal views on trade and currency policies were much 
more liberal, “but he clearly regarded full liberalization as a long-term goal” (ib.: n. 13). In Boughton’s account, like in 
Skidelsky’s, Keynes is shown fighting all his combats – world hegemony, preservation of the Empire, US bilateral aid to 
Britain, a new world order – with equal strength and at once, with “no chance of ever winning all of these battles” (ib.: 
15). However, Keynes himself is said by Boughton to have played a role in that: “White was more radical and far-
reaching  than  Keynes  in  the  effort  to  establish  multilateralism  and  currency  convertibility.  Keynes’s  resistance  to 
multilateralism was grounded in the need to preserve Britain’s special status through its central role in the Empire and 
its bilateral relationship with the United States” (ib.). 
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10 See below in the text. 
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12 JMK, Indian Currency and Finance, 1913, CW I: 69. 
13 Ib.: 125. 
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Cecco, 1979a). 
15 JMK, Indian Currency and Finance, 1913, CW I: 77. 
16 Ib.: 25. 
17 The same thesis has been defended among others by Harrod (1951) and Johnson & Johnson (1978), whereas criticisms 
has been advanced by Williamson (1983). On Indian Currency and Finance, see in general Vicarelli (1989). 
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19 JMK, A Treatise on Money, 1930, CW VI: 274. 
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crisis (Cesarano, 2006). 
21 As Keynes once noted, “[t]he management of an international standard is an art and not a science, and no one would 
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(in Moggridge, 1986: 70). 
22 A radical anti-classical prescription, though still based on classical foundations (Cesarano, 2003). 
23 JMK, “The Stabilisation of the European Exchanges: A Plan for Genoa”, 20 April 1922, CW XVII: 364. 
24 See Williamson, 1983, for an original discussion of the relevance of Keynes’s “crawling peg” proposals. 
25 According to Eichengreen (1998), cooperation was impeded, in the interwar period, by the lack of that “network 
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28 Ib.: 200. 
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31 In Fleming, 2000: 142. 
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